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ABSTRACT
This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal
legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically
objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The
Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpreta-
tion, incorporating transaction costs into the analysis for the first
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in which transaction costs likely constrained Congress and the
President from overriding the Court.
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“Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construc-
tion, nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and
we therefore may assume that our interpretation was correct.”1
“[Transactions] are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at
any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out
in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.”2
INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, the Democratic Party controlled both chambers
of Congress decisively; it also held the White House.3 And at least
twice during that two-year period, a conservative Supreme Court
issued statutory interpretation opinions deeply unpopular with
rank-and-file congressional Democrats and the President. In
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO), the Court ruled that a Texas municipal utility dis-
trict could “bail out” of the preclearance requirements of the Voting
Rights Act despite the state’s history of discrimination against
minority voters.4 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court expanded and ce-
mented the holding of a revolutionary 2007 case,5 finding that the
“short and plain statement” pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires all civil plaintiffs to
demonstrate that their factual contentions are “plausible” in order
to survive a motion to dismiss.6
Both NAMUDNO and Iqbal represent conservative interpreta-
tions very likely at odds with the preferences of the 111th Congress;
1. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 (1987).
2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
3. Charlie Savage, Democrats Look for Ways to Undo Late Bush Administration Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at A10.
4. 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009).
5. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (holding that, in order to state
a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, a plaintiff must plead enough facts to demonstrate
that an agreement was made).
6. 566 U.S. 662, 677-78, 684 (2009). The Iqbal opinion interpreted Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. However, the Rule has statutory force and can be revised
or overridden by Congress. See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The
Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 78-79 (2010). In fact, Congress did just that
with the entirety of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973. See Paul F. Rothstein,
The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 125-27 (1973).
Iqbal is thus functionally a statutory interpretation opinion.
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both opinions are also arguably deeply inconsistent with congressio-
nal preferences at the times the relevant statutory provisions were
enacted or reauthorized.7 Moreover, NAMUDNO and Iqbal were
both publicly salient cases; the New York Times published editorials
on both decisions, and members of Congress were obviously aware
of the opinions.8 But by the time the Democrat-dominated 111th
Congress gave way to the politically divided 112th Congress in
January 2011, the only political response to these decisions was
silence.
This silence raises a larger question: when the Supreme Court
interprets a statute, to what extent does subsequent congressional
inaction really represent political agreement with, or acquiescence
to, that interpretation? This is a difficult question to answer con-
clusively. The complex internal, intertemporal, and interdependent
dynamics of our political process are such that it is remarkably
hard to pin down “congressional intent” at the time a statute was
passed, at the time the Court issued its initial interpretation, or at
any point in the future.9
In this Article, I approach the old puzzle of congressional silence
in a new way. In particular, I explore the economics of congressional
overrides in a spatial model that sheds more and better light on the
conditions under which the political branches may not be able to
respond to an undesirable judicial interpretation. My approach is
7. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism and the Interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 857, 878 (2011); Editorial, Restoring Access to the Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A40.
8. Editorial, The Voting Rights Act Survives, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A24;
Editorial, Throwing Out Mr. Iqbal’s Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at A28; see also Access
to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement
of Hon. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil
Liberties); Brief of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at
10-13, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 815238 at *10-14.
9. Commentators are divided on this issue. Textualists typically reject any claim that
congressional silence has meaning, whereas purposivists tend to find at least some signal in
long-standing congressional silence. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-
72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing the textualist view); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID
CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND
LAWYERING STRATEGIES 44-47, 49-51 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining the purposivism and
textualism theories); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and
Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 8-13 (1988) (discussing various interpretations of the
meaning of congressional silence).
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grounded in public choice and positive political theory, but this
Article represents a significant extension of my earlier work,10
incorporating transaction cost economics concepts to further refine
our understanding of the relationship between the political
branches and the judiciary.
Other scholars have used the insights of public choice theory11 to
generate a variety of normative approaches to the problems of
statutory interpretation and judicial review more generally.12 For
the most part, this work assumes that self-interest ends at the foot
of the judge’s bench; these authors are primarily concerned with
telling judges how they should interpret statutes in light of the
interest group dynamics that public choice theory sees as defining
the content of enacted legislation.13 They therefore tend to take
judicial fidelity to some form of legislative intent as a given.
Nonetheless, telling judges how they should act does not say all
that much about how they will act, and we cannot assume that
judges will always interpret statutes consistently with either orig-
inal legislative intent or the current political climate.
10. Stancil, supra note 6 (exploring the committee rule-making process and the potential
for transaction-cost arbitrage).
11. For an excellent introduction to public choice theory, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS &
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
12. See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION (2008); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986). In
fairness, Professor Elhauge does not really offer a normative approach to judicial review;
rather, he argues persuasively, if somewhat nihilistically, that any normative approach to
judicial review premised on interest group theory contains a submerged and highly
contestable normative baseline of its own. ELHAUGE, supra, at 2, 263-72.
13. Compare, e.g., Macey, supra note 12, at 226-27 (encouraging courts to construe
statutes in ways that further public interest objects while limiting interest group payoffs),
with Eskridge, supra note 12, at 323-24 (encouraging courts to “update” statutes by reference
to the broad or narrow distribution of costs and benefits associated with the statute). The fact
that these authors focus on telling judges what to do does not mean that they are insensitive
to the issue of judicial preferences; rather, they simply use interest group theory as a
framework for evaluating the proper normative approach of a hypothetically disinterested
judge.
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A second, somewhat less-developed vein of scholarship does
attempt to account for potential divergence between judicial and
political policy preferences, incorporating those differences into
preliminary positive models of judicial behavior. Pablo Spiller and
his coauthors offer the purest examples of the genre, though their
work both builds upon and complements work by numerous others,
all of whom employ positive political theory/pivotal politics models14
to analyze interactions between the executive, legislatures, courts,
and administrative agencies.15 Spiller in particular takes an impor-
tant first step in explaining judicial discretion in economic terms,
describing various features of the relationship between courts,
legislatures, and the executive in game theoretical terms that
expressly account for diverging policy preferences among the
President, House, Senate, and Supreme Court.16
14. The two labels are effectively synonyms; both refer to the study of political outcomes
using formal methods, such as social choice theory, game theory, and statistical analysis. See,
e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 20-48 (1998); Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO.
L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (explaining that positive political theory “consists of non-normative,
rational-choice theories of political institutions”).
15. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game,
80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational
Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and
Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”:
Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs,
75 VA. L. REV. 499 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political
Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992); McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3 [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent]
(McNollgast is an amalgam of Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, who
together have written a series of deeply influential positive political theory articles);
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons]; Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Congress Is a “ They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INT ’L REV. L. &
ECON. 239 (1992).
16. For ease of reference, I use the term “Spiller” generically to refer to this body of work;
references to specific articles will contain the names of all relevant authors. See, e.g., Mario
Bergara, Barak Richmond & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision
Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247 (2003); Gely & Spiller, supra
note 15; Pablo T. Spiller, Agency Discretion Under Judicial Review, 16 MATHEMATICAL &
COMPUTER MODELING 185 (1992); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or
Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions,
1949-88, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to
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This earlier work is deliberately preliminary in one critical way:
none of the preexisting models incorporate the transaction costs
associated with political responses to judicial missteps. This
omission, although understandable and intentional, is nonetheless
significant.
As commentators dating back to Hart and Sacks have recognized,
it is costly to draft and pass legislation overriding an undesirable
judicial interpretation.17 Moreover, it is particularly difficult for the
political branches to control the courts by other means. They cannot
effectively fire, suspend, or chastise Article III judges for failing to
effectuate congressional desires.18 Sitting at the apex of a coequal
branch of government, Justices of the Supreme Court are even less
subject to effective direct control than Article III judges generally.19
The costs associated with an affirmative legislative response to
mistaken statutory interpretation thus take on outsized importance
because alternative mechanisms of control are functionally unavail-
able.20
Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT ’L REV. L. & ECON. 503
(1996).
17. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164-65 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the various functions of the legislature and the inherent time
and cost requirements). 
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; How the Federal Courts Are Organized: Federal Judges
and How They Get Appointed, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://1.usa.gov/yS2Cwc (last visited Feb.
14, 2013). The nonoverride options available to political players dissatisfied with judicial
action are not merely limited. Rather, they are typically the regulatory equivalent of nuclear
weapons, useful primarily for their deterrent effect in preventing interbranch “total war.” See
infra Part I.B.1.c. Impeachment, funding restrictions, and even jurisdiction stripping are
dramatic and independently costly responses; they will likely be viewed as disproportionate
to the offense in the typical statutory interpretation dispute. Other mechanisms for
controlling the courts—such as refusing to confirm appointments and manipulating the
vacancy rate, for example—although less radical, are also less likely to hit their intended
target without substantial, unintended collateral damage.
19. The same odd dynamic exists at some level for non-Article III judges as well. It is also
present, if perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, in the context of many regulatory relationships.
Compared to a business executive hired to manage a private corporation, for example, an
executive branch agency administrator is quite insulated from direct control, as is even an
elected state court judge.
20. As I discuss below, control costs are relevant insofar as they form the backdrop for
the discretion-eliminating statutory specificity upon which the analysis depends. The more
deterministic a statutory command, the lower the costs of disciplining the Court for
misinterpretation. This is true even when the current Congress disagrees with the
deterministic statute in question on policy grounds, because the broader costs to Congress
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In this Article, I elaborate a more robust economic model of
legislation and statutory interpretation in which Justices interact
with the Executive and the Legislature to shape public policy. More
formally, I incorporate regulatory transaction costs into a model21
that predicts specific statutory interpretation policy outcomes in the
context of a single interaction between the Court and the political
branches. The result depends upon both the parties’ ex ante pre-
ferences and the transaction costs those parties face when respond-
ing to a judicial interpretation inconsistent with those preferences.22
I do not purport to explain judicial behavior completely, of course.
Despite the constant drumbeat of popular criticism, many judges—
even Supreme Court Justices—often do their best to interpret
statutes in good faith, regardless of their abstract policy preferences
on the issue under consideration.23 Moreover, the repeat player
of allowing the Court to reject deterministic commands more generally are so extraordinarily
high.
21. In even more formal terms, I present a single-iteration spatial model. This simply
means that the model focuses on a single interaction between the Court and the political
branches without regard to future consequences, and that I use one- and two-dimensional
diagrams to develop and explain the model. The single-iteration limitation is significant;
though I discuss repeat player concerns briefly in various places, I will take them up more
thoroughly in subsequent work. My spatial modeling technique represents a logical extension
of a well-accepted methodology in the public choice and political science literatures. Though
I do not present a formal model with equations, “model” is nonetheless the appropriate label.
22. This Article is the foundation of a series of articles in which I will comprehensively
explore the transaction cost economics of regulation. The insights of this foundational piece
apply with equal force and little alteration in effectively every regulatory context involving
one or more veto players and agents with interpretive authority. Like Spiller, I retain several
traditional assumptions in order to better illustrate the effects that transaction costs have
upon political outcomes. See, e.g., Gely & Spiller, supra note 15, at 267-68. Specifically, I
retain the assumption that each policy interaction between the Court, legislature, and the
executive is a single-iteration game; this in turn eliminates the complication of expressing
transaction costs in net present value terms. I also bracket the problem of intermediate
signaling strategies. I will take on these issues in subsequent work. While I acknowledge
that a spatial model of the sort I present cannot capture all of the richness and complexity
of real-world interactions between and among the executive, legislators, and judges, my two-
dimensional model that incorporates transaction costs comes close enough to provide
significant insight and, as important, testable hypotheses.
23. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885-87 (1975) (articulating a theory of
judicial interpretation in which judges’ incentives lie with enforcing the terms of the original
statutory deal); see also MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED
COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE, at xi (2011) (explaining that
Supreme Court Justices are constrained in their decisions by external forces). I leave aside
questions regarding the backdrop against which good faith is to be evaluated. 
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nature of the relationships between Congress, the President, the
Court, and various interest groups is likely to exercise some
mitigating influence upon judicial behavior, as will courts’ inde-
pendent incentives to enforce original statutory bargains.24 Even
assuming that the various players25 do act to maximize the real-
ization of their own preferences in any given interaction, a simpli-
fied, stylized model of the sort I present cannot hope to capture
every nuance of the complicated regulatory dance. In particular, the
introduction of uncertainty would likely affect outcomes dramati-
cally, relative to a model assuming perfect and complete knowledge
of each player’s preferences.26 At the same time, however, a single-
iteration model assuming that judges are motivated by base self-
interest helps identify the specific contexts in which courts have
space to move policy away from the nominal political consensus
without the threat of legislative override.27
This Article has three parts. In Part I, I present a unidimensional
version of the model, exploring the issue in the context of a
hypothetical debate over federal policy regarding the appropriate
number of charter schools. Specifically, a hypothetically self-
interested Supreme Court has granted certiorari on a case requiring
it to interpret a preexisting charter schools statute; its interpre-
tation will fix policy somewhere along a continuum from fewer to
more schools, subject to the threat of override by the political
24. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 885-86; McNollgast, Positive Canons,
supra note 15, at 706.
25. Throughout the Article, I refer to the House, Senate, President, and Supreme Court
as “players”; although one can easily conceptualize my analysis in game theoretical terms,
I deliberately avoid a formal game theoretical analysis because the baggage associated with
such an analysis tends to obscure the point. My model demonstrates the incentives facing
various regulatory actors by virtue of the costs associated with political action. To the extent
its assumptions mirror reality, it thus helps us to define the zones within which the Supreme
Court can stray from political preferences without correction, without regard for whether
such deviations are intentional or accidental.
26. As discussed in Part III below, the model can be expanded to include uncertainty with
some additional effort; I will take up this project in subsequent work.
27. In later work, I will also take up repeat player issues, including an analysis of the
judicial costs associated with deviation from political preferences. For now, however, I am
interested in a hypothetical Court that is motivated solely by a desire to see the best possible
result, from its perspective, in connection with the policies implicated by a single statute up
for review on a writ of certiorari. My analysis thus helps establish a baseline for the amount
of discretion available to the Court in the context of a single case.
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branches. In this hypothetical, the Court’s preferences lie well to
the right of the preferences of all three political players.28
I first present a traditional, transaction-cost-free analysis. In a
world without response costs, the Court will be unable to establish
any interpretation outside the ideal point of the political player
whose preferences are closest to the Court’s.29 If the status quo ante
lies anywhere to the left of the rightmost political player’s ideal
point, the Court can still move policy permanently in its preferred
direction by selecting the interpretation consistent with that closest
political player’s ideal preferences.30 But it can go no further. 
Once we introduce player-specific response costs, the calculus
changes. Under certain cost conditions, the Court will have limited
or no ability to step outside the nearest player’s ideal point. Under
other cost conditions, the political players’ response costs may
provide the Court with an interpretive safe haven well outside of
the closest political player’s ideal point. Under still others, the
extent of the Court’s ability to step outside is indeterminate, and
will depend upon the political players’ own internal bargaining
power dynamics.
The players’ net cost-benefit calculations drive the analysis. In
general terms, the Court’s discretion to deviate is limited by the
response costs of the lowest-cost political player. Given the nature
of the legislative enterprise, it will often be the case that a single
low-response-cost political player can limit judicial discretion
without significant assistance from its other political counterparts.
28. This is not necessary to the model in any way, but it does simplify the presentation
somewhat. See infra Part I.
29. Without incorporating transaction costs, the analysis is quite similar to that of
Eskridge and Ferejohn, whose work offered the inspiration for an expanded analysis
incorporating transaction costs. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 15. As with any
multimember body, the Supreme Court as a whole does not technically have a preference of
its own; rather, in the unidimensional context, we identify “its” ideal point by identifying the
preference of the Court’s median member. Because the median member’s vote provides a
coalition with the minimum five votes necessary for a majority, her preference is dispositive.
The same is true for the chambers of Congress. In two or more dimensions, formal median-
member modeling is no longer valid, but we can estimate player ideal points in a similar way.
See, e.g., Gely & Spiller, supra note 15, at 270-98 (providing models estimating the various
players’ ideal points); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV.
431, 436-39 (1989) (same). But see Shepsle, supra note 15, at 254 (noting that the mechanics
of actual legislative give-and-take make reliance on such models questionable).
30. See, e.g., Gely & Spiller, supra note 15, at 264, 276.
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If the internal dynamics of the House of Representatives make it a
particularly low-cost responder, for example,31 its ability to pull the
laboring oar for the Senate and President may leave the Court with
relatively little space in which to interpret outside of the political
consensus. This may be the case even if the Senate and President
face relatively high response costs of their own, because the Senate
and President can free ride on the House’s efforts to craft a
legislative response. By contrast, when response costs are high for
all players, the Court may possess substantial, additional interpre-
tive discretion.
To determine whether a particular interpretation is viable—that
is, safe from congressional override—we look to each player’s re-
sponse costs and the associated benefits. If the politically-
bargained-for response to the Court’s interpretation will necessarily
result in benefits to one or more political players in excess of their
respective response costs, then that interpretation will not stand.
And if the response to a given interpretation will necessarily result
in benefits less than each political player’s response costs, then that
interpretation is safe from revision. But if the net cost-benefit
determination depends instead upon the precise distribution of
bargaining power among the political players,32 the viability of that
interpretation is ambiguous under the terms of the model.
Part II adds a layer of complexity to the analysis, expanding the
unidimensional model in Part I into a two-dimensional model of the
same hypothetical regarding a federal charter schools policy.33
Instead of focusing solely upon federal policy regarding the ideal
number of charter schools, Part II disaggregates the question into
two separate components: (1) as before, federal policy regarding the
ideal number of charter schools and (2) the appropriate level of
federal funding for those schools, from low to high.34 
31. Lower-cost responders may have substantially greater relevant expertise than their
higher-cost counterparts, be less busy, and care more about the particular issue relative to
other issues. See infra Part III.
32. Or those players’ reputation for reliability. See infra note 66 and accompanying text;
infra Part I.B.2.c.iv.
33. For clarity of expression and ease of understanding, the model I present deliberately
omits a few significant features of the federal law-making apparatus, including the veto
override. These omissions do not alter the insights of the model in any appreciable way,
though they may affect specific results in individual cases.
34. I assume that electoral concerns drive the preferences of the House, Senate, and
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I expand the model into two dimensions for several reasons.
First, most—probably all—legislation implicitly involves two or
more discrete policy dimensions.35 These dimensions may interact
in interesting ways. Specifically, the introduction of a second di-
mension may allow the Court to play one dimension against
another, sacrificing on one axis in order to obtain a net advantage
by improving its position along the other.36 Allowing for inter-
activity between dimensions brings the model one significant step
closer to approximating the real world.
Relatedly, the addition of a second dimension will ultimately
allow for consideration of a critical feature of our real-world polit-
ical process: differences in intensity of preference along the various
policy dimensions implicated by a particular legislative initiative.
For the purposes of this foundational analysis, I assume that the
players each value both dimensions—an ideal number of charter
schools and a preferred federal funding level for charter schools—
equally. Though this will not always be the case, it is not possible
to explore the intensity-of-preference dynamic in a single-dimen-
sional model.37
Because the House, Senate, and President each possess a veto
over policy choices, agreed-upon statutory policies must generally
fall within a range acceptable to all three players.38 As in the unidi-
President. Because members of the Supreme Court enjoy life tenure, they are assumed to
exhibit their heartfelt preferences regarding the policy outcome under consideration. Again,
this may not be the case for many judges most of the time, but modeling how things might
play out if and when judges do act out of self-interest informs our broader understanding of
the myriad of inputs that together produce judicial behavior.
35. These dimensions may be complementary or competing.
36. The same dynamic is present with respect to issues involving more than two policy
dimensions, but graphical presentation is not feasible for those issues.
37. I will take up this issue in future work.
38. This is formally a veto player problem. Veto player theory generally refers to a game
theoretical approach to political decision making in which one or more players possess the
ability to veto any change to the status quo. See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002) (explaining that individual political institutions
possess “veto” power). In the context of the U.S. federal system, the House, Senate, and the
President each possess at least limited veto power, as does the Supreme Court in matters of
constitutional interpretation. See id. at 19, 226. For now, I assume that the President’s veto
power is absolute, rather than limited by the override provisions of Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution. If I were to relax that assumption, I would then need to introduce an additional
set of preferences—those of the key members of the House and Senate whose votes would be
necessary to override the President’s veto. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 15, at
529-32.
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mensional example, self-interested judges enjoy only limited power
to move statutory policy within that circumscribed range in a world
without transaction costs.39 But the existence of response costs
substantially increases judicial interpretive discretion in many
contexts.
As in the unidimensional example, the model demonstrates that
the range of potential judicial discretion is circumscribed, if at all,
by the net cost-benefit analysis of the political players. The two-
dimensional analysis also demonstrates that the Court can
sometimes obtain “protection” of a sort for its more self-interested
interpretations from one or more of the political players, by trading
one dimension off for another. 
Because each Supreme Court interpretation establishes a new
status quo policy, Court interpretations closer to particular political
players’ preferences can circumscribe the policy range over which
the political players will be able to agree to a legislative override.
When the Court’s interpretation lies close enough to one player’s
ideal policy to eliminate the possibility of net benefit for any
political player contemplating a costly response, that interpretation
will survive despite dissatisfaction from even relatively low-cost
responders, and despite the fact that it lies outside the “natural”
negotiation range for the political players. In the two-dimensional
context, equivalent interpretations from the Court’s perspective
may well have very different implications with respect to the
likelihood of a political response. I demonstrate this phenomenon
graphically, showing that three interpretations that are equivalent
from the Court’s perspective yield three different political outcomes
—a guaranteed legislative response, a guaranteed “safe harbor” for
the Court, and an indeterminate outcome dependent upon political
player bargaining power and credibility.40
In Part III, I offer amplifications and applications of the basic
model. First, I offer a preliminary sketch of the types of costs that
might factor into each political player’s response calculus. Though
there is room for debate and expansion, the basic components of a
response-cost function are (1) process costs, (2) search and specific-
ity costs, and (3) opportunity costs. Even if a player can precisely
39. See, e.g., Gely & Spiller, supra note 15, at 264-65.
40. See infra Figures 12-17.
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identify and articulate its ideal policy, the federal legislative pro-
cess is inherently costly; the committee system alone produces enor-
mous process costs for even the simplest legislation.41 Moreover, it
is often remarkably costly to articulate policy in deterministic,
discretion-eliminating terms. Of course, some issues are more
difficult to pin down than others; search and specificity costs will be
relatively higher for those issues. Similarly, each political player
must independently assess the relative importance of each objec-
tionable judicial interpretation in comparison to that player’s other
goals; the less important the issue to a given player, the higher that
player’s opportunity costs of responding. 
Second, I describe the ways in which interest groups can sub-
stantially affect the political players’ response costs as well, even in
a single-iteration game. A focused and motivated interest group can
lower political response costs by supplying research, providing
ready-to-wear draft legislation, or making the issue more salient,
thereby lowering relative opportunity costs; such groups can also
raise response costs by interfering in the response negotiation pro-
cess. The influence of an interest group may be asymmetrical,
depending on the political player with which the group is interact-
ing. An interest group may be able to decrease or increase costs
more effectively as to the House, Senate, or President, depending on
the extent of that group’s connections to that branch of government.
In some cases, interest groups will be less able to affect outcomes
because they will be strongest where their strength does them the
least good.
Finally, I briefly explore the illustrative value of the model by
applying it retroactively to three real-world contexts. I begin with
a potential paradigm example in Iqbal, one of two recent, much-
criticized Supreme Court civil pleading standard decisions to which
Congress has yet to respond.42 In Iqbal, the Court may have taken
advantage of extremely high response costs to interpret an ambigu-
ous provision restrictively, holding that all federal civil plaintiffs
must demonstrate the “plausibility” of their claims to survive a
motion to dismiss.43
41. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 164-65 (noting that the number of problems the
legislature deals with vastly exceeds the time needed to handle the issues).
42. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
43. Id. at 678, 684.
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I then discuss the extent to which the Court can sometimes
obtain additional interpretive space in the statutory context by
merely threatening constitutional review; this is a particularly
plausible account of the recent NAMUDNO case.44 In NAMUDNO,
the Court supported its expansive interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act’s “bailout” provision, at least in part, with a rather
explicit threat that the underlying statute might be unconstitu-
tional.45
I conclude by comparing Iqbal and NAMUDNO to Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,46 a case that did ultimately result in
a congressional override, albeit only after Congress and the White
House had changed hands.47 In that case, relatively low response
costs arguably made it possible for the political branches to issue an
override as the first legislative act of the 111th Congress, just nine
days after President Obama took office.48
We cannot prove legislative intent definitively, of course, any
more than we can conclusively pinpoint contemporaneous political
preferences or the Court’s underlying intentions in either set of
cases. But we can tell a plausible story that in Iqbal and
NAMUDNO, the Court successfully privileged its own outcome
preferences over both the intent of the enacting Congress and the
preferences of the then-current political infrastructure. Ledbetter,
on the other hand, stands as an illustration of the kind of low-
response-cost regulatory problem for which direct, contemporaneous
deviation from political preferences would be impractical for the
Court.
44. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
45. Id. at 205-06.
46. The Ledbetter decision is consistent with my model because Congress did not override
it until President Obama took office in January 2009. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (2006)) (enacted
Jan. 29, 2009). Nonetheless, the ease with which the 111th Congress overrode the decision
illustrates the relevant dynamics perfectly.
47. 550 U.S. 619 (2007), superceded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
48. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (enacted Jan. 29, 2009).
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I. A UNIDIMENSIONAL MODEL OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
A. Introduction
Government is complicated. At the federal level, even the
simplest decisions ultimately involve hundreds of legislators and
staffers, all with their own preferences and personalities. Moreover,
seemingly disparate government decisions themselves are often
intertwined with one another, sometimes in a hopelessly compli-
cated and unpredictable fashion.49 It might thus seem a fool’s er-
rand to attempt to reduce this extraordinary complexity into a
highly simplified, stylized model of government behavior.
In some ways, it is. No simplified model can capture all of the
nuances and complexities of government decision making; accord-
ingly, no reasonably parsimonious model of government behavior
can fully and persuasively explain any specific government out-
come. At the same time, simplified models serve an enormously
valuable function by helping to explain and understand government
conduct in the aggregate. When a model generates empirically
testable hypotheses, the results of the follow-up empirical studies
supporting or rejecting those hypotheses further enrich our under-
standing of how government and law actually work. 
Good models, even stripped down or highly stylized, capture the
essence of political and judicial processes. No matter how compli-
cated the internal politics of the House Committee on Agriculture
are, for example, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Committee will
ever report a bill that does not enjoy the support of the committee
chair. Pivotal politics models leverage this reality by examining the
preferences of the various pivotal players in the political process
and then predicting results based upon the intersection of those
preferences with key institutional features of the regulatory con-
text.50 In this Part, I present a single-dimension pivotal politics
analysis of statutory interpretation incorporating political response
costs.
49. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 328 (1950).
50. See, e.g., KREHBIEL, supra note 14, at 20-48.
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B. The Single-Dimension Model
1. The Set-Up
a. No Transaction Costs
Imagine a transaction-cost-free nation in which the Supreme
Court is the only regulatory decision maker.51 The Court’s word is
law, but it has inherited a set of preexisting legal and social policies
from its predecessor Courts. Now focus on a single policy—for
example, the nation’s position on charter schools operating along-
side traditional public and private elementary and secondary
schools. In our hypothetical world, previous Supreme Courts were
generally, if not absolutely, antagonistic to the idea of charter
schools, especially relative to the current Court. If we label the
inherited legislative policy as Li, and the current Court’s preference
as SC, we can represent the status quo ante graphically by placing
these labels at their appropriate locations along a continuum
ranging from “Fewer Charter Schools” on the left to “More Charter
Schools” on the right. Because the Court is the only political actor
in this example, it will set policy at x, its own ideal point:
51. Beyond the introduction of transaction costs and unless stated otherwise, standard
modeling assumptions undergird the model. For example, for now we assume that each
player knows all other players’ ideal points, and that player preferences are unipeaked,
linear, and Cartesian. This simply means that each player’s satisfaction decreases as policy
moves away from her ideal point in any direction, and that changes in player satisfaction can
be measured by measuring changes in distance from player ideal points.
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Now assume instead that there are two relevant political actors,
the Supreme Court and a monolithic political apparatus P with veto
power over any Court interpretation with which it disagrees. In this
example, the political apparatus is less hostile to charter schools
than the inherited legislative policy, but it is substantially less
enthusiastic about them than the Court. When the Court interprets
the inherited statute, it will be able to move policy away from the
inherited policy and toward its own preferred outcome, but it
cannot move past P without drawing a legislative override. Thus,
the result of a judicial interpretation in a world without transaction
costs will fall at P:
b. With Transaction Costs
The equilibrium changes when we introduce transaction costs
into the mix. Even a political monolith faces response costs. For
example, it may be difficult and costly for the political apparatus to
articulate its preferences in detailed, deterministic, and thus
discretion-eliminating terms. Or the issue of charter schools may
fall far down on the list of the political apparatus’s regulatory
priorities. Whatever the source, it is almost certainly the case that
the political apparatus would accept an interpretation that deviates
to some degree from its ideal point without unlimbering the
regulatory machinery; we can express this acceptable deviation in
policy space terms as p*.52
Put a different way, p* represents the political player’s
“transaction-cost-adjusted” indifference point. Similarly, the space
between P and p* is that player’s “indifference zone”; the political
52. In later Figures, I will use h* and s* to denote the House’s and Senate’s acceptable
deviations, respectively.
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apparatus is indifferent between an interpretation at p* (that it
could correct to P by incurring its response costs) and costless policy
P. It follows that the political apparatus will not incur costs with
respect to any interpretation within its indifference zone—that is,
closer to P than p*.53 
The distance between P and p* thus represents the political ap-
paratus’s response costs, rp,54 reduced to policy space. As long as the
Court’s interpretation does not fall to the right of p*, the political
apparatus will not respond with overriding legislation; thus p*
becomes the response-cost-adjusted equilibrium because it is the
best the Court can do without provoking a political response:
c. The Shape of the Override
Throughout this Article, the terms “transaction costs” and
“response costs” refer to the costs associated with crafting what is
effectively a discretion-eliminating statutory regime. In other
words, these are the costs associated with drafting a highly de-
tailed, effectively deterministic statutory scheme that would
prevent a future Court from “interpreting” its way to an outcome
inconsistent with political preferences.
As a technical matter, of course, no statutory scheme is truly
discretion eliminating in the context of judicial interpretation. If the
Supreme Court were to declare that “black is white,” we would not
expect its members to be consumed by heavenly fire. Rather, a
discretion-eliminating statute for our purposes is one that is
53. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 224-28 (1993).
54. In later Figures, I will use rh and rs to denote the House’s and Senate’s response costs,
respectively.
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sufficiently detailed and deterministic that it would be political
suicide for the Court to reject the policy expressed thereby. 
Put another way, a discretion-eliminating statute is one that
“makes the unthinkable thinkable,” by putting the political
branches’ few nuclear options—impeachment, funding cuts, juris-
diction stripping—on the table. A sufficiently detailed statute is
effectively a precommitment strategy by the political players in a
regulatory game of chicken; once such a statute is in place, the
political branches will be forced to respond if the Court disobeys
their direct commands.55
2. Federalizing the Problem
a. The Players
It complicates matters only a little when we disaggregate our
hypothetical monolithic political apparatus into a more realistic
model of the federal system. The federal law-making apparatus
contemplates a distinct role for each of the three branches of gov-
ernment.56 For a bill to become law, both the House and the Senate
first must pass identically worded statutes.57 The President may
then sign the bill into law or issue a veto.58 Once a statute is
enacted, the judiciary possesses primary responsibility for inter-
preting the meaning of that statute, ostensibly in accordance with
congressional intent.59
55. In future work, I will take up the issue of half measures—that is, legislative
responses that fall short of a full-blown discretion-eliminating congressional override. There
are a number of possible half measures, ranging from subtle legislative threats to full-blown
agency delegation (which would carry with it discretion-related risks of its own), but for now,
it is more than enough to consider only the absolute response.
56. U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
57. Id. art. I, § 7; Lyrics to I’m Just a Bill, LYRICSMANIA, lyricsmania.com/im_just_a_
bill_lyrics_schoolhouse_rock.html. (last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (“Now I go to the House of
Representatives, and they vote on me.... Then I go to the Senate and the whole thing starts
all over again.”).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Although the Constitution articulates a specific procedure for
overriding a presidential veto (two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress), I omit this feature
for simplicity’s sake, instead treating the President’s veto power as absolute. If we were to
include the veto override feature, it would not change the core insights of the model, though
it would affect the location of final outcomes in certain limited contexts. 
59. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984);
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978).
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 A useful model of federal statutory interpretation must therefore
account for the preferences of at least four players: the House of
Representatives, the Senate, the President, and the Supreme
Court.60 Of course, with the exception of the President, each of these
players is actually a multimember body. Things get even more com-
plex in the context of the Supreme Court because the process by
which the Supreme Court grants certiorari is itself subject to
strategic behavior.61 At the same time, the pivotal politics approach
allows us to simplify preferences with some confidence. At the end
of the day, the people who matter most are the pivotal players
within each body whose preferences must be satisfied to obtain the
majorities necessary for action.62
b. A World Without Transaction Costs
In our hypothetical, the House, Senate, and President each have
their own independent preferences with respect to the ideal number
of charter schools. Suppose, for example, that the House is gener-
ally opposed to the notion of charter schools, so much so that its
ideal point falls to the left of the inherited statutory policy. The
Senate is somewhat more sympathetic to the idea, with an ideal
point just to the right of the inherited position, and the President’s
ideal point falls still further to the right. But all three political
players’ preferences are well left of that of the Supreme Court. In
a world without transaction costs, the political ideal point closest to
60. The model can be generalized to other contexts, for example individual states, but
there is enough overlap in state and federal law-making procedure that focusing on the
familiar federal system is appropriate.
61. See H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 11-12 (1991). Because of this complexity, I treat the Court as a monolith as
well; for all intents and purposes, the point SC on the relevant preference maps represents
the pivotal preference of the Supreme Court. I save the complexities of lower-court inter-
pretations for later work.
62. See generally McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 15 (analyzing pivotal
players). As Gely and Spiller note, the median voter theorem does not hold precisely in
multidimensional analysis, insofar as it is difficult if not impossible to identify a “median
voter” within a body along more than one dimension. See Gely & Spiller, supra note 15, at
267. That said, a pivotal politics approach is still workable using a somewhat looser approach
to identification of the relevant pivotal members. See id. at 267-68; see also McNollgast,
Positive Canons, supra note 15 (applying a pivotal politics approach to two-dimensional
spatial analysis).
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the Supreme Court’s (here, the President’s ideal point P) defines the
equilibrium: 
If the Court adopts interpretation P, neither the Senate nor the
House can do anything to improve its lot. The President will be at
her ideal point and will veto any attempt to move policy further to
the left. 
If the Court attempts to adopt any point to the right of P, the
political players will respond with overriding legislation. If the
Court was to err by adopting such a point, the precise location of
the overriding policy would depend upon two things: (1) the relative
bargaining power of the House, Senate, and President and (2) the
distance between the offending interpretation and the presidential
ideal point P. Because the President is a veto player, and because
all three political players must agree in order to enact an override,
the President need not accept any override policy that makes her
worse off than the judicial interpretation.
But this is irrelevant to the Supreme Court, because any re-
sulting override would be worse from its perspective than P. Under
our informational assumptions, the Court will thus avoid the prob-
lem entirely by adopting interpretation P.
c. A World with Transaction Costs
As in Figure 3 above, now assume that each political player must
incur response costs in order to generate deterministic, discretion-
eliminating legislation in response to an objectionable Court inter-
pretation. The dynamic is a bit different in the multilateral context.
Mirroring real life to a significant degree, the model assumes that
only one political player needs to expend its response costs to
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produce the discretion-eliminating response. Assuming that the
responding player correctly identifies a mutually agreeable policy—
a function of relative political player bargaining power, among other
things63—the other political players can free ride on that expendi-
ture, agreeing to the response at effectively no cost to themselves.64
Importantly, the presence of multiple veto players means that a
political player cannot generally anticipate that the expenditure of
response costs will result in a statutory policy at that player’s own
ideal point. Rather, the final legislative policy will be a function of
response bargaining between multiple veto players. Thus, the
length of a political player’s inaction zone represents the “amount”
that player must “spend,” in issue-specific policy space terms, to
secure a discretion-eliminating legislative override (assuming
agreement from the other relevant veto players).65 That player will
only spend that amount if it expects to receive more than its expen-
ditures in return. The following examples illustrate the analysis.
i. An Untenable Interpretation
Thus, the operative question in a transaction-cost-adjusted world
is whether any of the three political players has an incentive to
expend response costs, given the location of the judicial interpreta-
tion on the continuum and the other political players’ preferences
and cost functions. Returning to our hypothetical, first consider a
judicial interpretation that will necessarily result in a congres-
sional override. In this example, the House ideal point, H, lies
significantly to the left of all other players’ ideal points, and the
House’s response costs, rh, are relatively low; in other words, the
distance between H and h* is small. The Senate’s response costs are
somewhat higher, but the President’s response costs are similar to
those of the House:
63. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998).
64. There are, of course, a variety of ways in which the political players might attempt
to gain advantage in the negotiation process, but the single-payment assumption captures
the essence of many—if not most—interactions.
65. For the purposes of this Article, I also assume that half measures are infeasible—that
is, that the legislature and executive cannot obtain somewhat better results at discounted
cost. I will relax this assumption in future work building on the basic model.
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If the Court attempted to fix policy at J1, the House would
respond, because its net benefits from a statutory response would
necessarily be greater than its response costs. In a second-stage
negotiation, the House would do no worse than P, and then only if
the President held all of the bargaining power as between the
political players. Thus, the minimum improvement for the House
is the distance from J1 to P; because its response costs are substan-
tially lower than its minimum improvement, it will respond, and
interpretation J1 is untenable.
Though the House’s cost-benefit analysis is dispositive of the
issue, it is worth exploring the calculus facing the Senate and
President in Figure 5 as well. The Senate’s costs, rs, are substan-
tially higher than the other players’. As a result, it is unclear
whether the Senate would respond to interpretation J1. If the
Senate holds all of the bargaining power such that the response
lands at its ideal point, S, a response is worth it; it would expend
significantly less than its total benefit from the response. The same
is true, albeit to a slightly lesser extent, if the President holds all of
the bargaining power such that the response fixes policy at P. But
if the House holds all of the bargaining power, the Senate would
improve its position by less than its response costs; it would
therefore stay on the sidelines if the House were particularly
powerful relative to the other two political players. 
Despite her much lower response costs, the President’s calculus
is similar, primarily because the judicial interpretation in question
lies much closer to her ideal point. As with the other players, the
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President will be willing to expend her response costs in pursuit of
any response equilibrium that improves her final position by more
than those costs. This will be true for much of the potential
agreement range between H and P, but the distance between H and
P is virtually identical to the distance between P and J1. The
President will not be willing to expend her response costs, rp, to end
up in exactly the same place she was before; she will only incur
costs if the final equilibrium lies closer to her own ideal point from
H by an amount equal to or greater than rp.
ii. A Safe Interpretation
Some cost and preference distributions create substantially more
space in which the Court can fix policy without drawing a legisla-
tive override. Consider our charter schools debate in a slightly
different set of circumstances. Here, the political players’ absolute
preferences are identical to those in Figure 5, but both their cost
functions and the interpretation selected by the Court are some-
what different. In particular, the House faces enormously high
response costs; the Senate’s and the President’s are only modestly
greater than in the previous example. 
The Court’s interpretation is also different; in this example, the
Court selects a policy, J2, outside of the range over which the polit-
ical parties would negotiate a response, but substantially closer to
P than in Figure 5:
Here none of the political players will respond, because each
player’s best-case scenario—policy fixed at that player’s own ideal
point—is too costly. Interpretation J2 lies inside all three political
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players’ indifference ranges; none of them will expend more than
they get in return.
iii. An Indeterminate Interpretation?
Sometimes it will not be possible for the model to determine the
result of a particular interpretation without adopting heroically
unrealistic assumptions about the Court’s political acumen.66 In
particular, when the decision to respond to a repetitive specific
interpretation comes down to an assessment of relative bargaining
power as to all three political players, the outcome is simply too
uncertain for a risk-averse Court to chance. 
Consider again the same distribution of absolute preferences, but
with a different set of cost functions. In Figure 7, the House faces
the highest response costs, though they are somewhat lower than
in the previous example. Senatorial and presidential costs are
somewhat lower and substantially lower, respectively, and the
Court is considering an interpretation, J3, well to the right of all
three political players’ ideal points:
It is not clear whether interpretation J3 will invite a congressional
response. Because the President will be unwilling to accept any
66. In later work, I will analyze the ways in which uncertainty of various forms might
affect the analysis; however, it is at least plausible to assume that the Court knows generally
how the House, Senate, and President would likely come down on a particular issue. It is
similarly plausible that the Court has some rough idea of the costs attendant with a political
response. It is far less plausible to assume that the Court is able to assess with any reliability
the distribution of bargaining power among the House, Senate, and President with respect
to any given issue.
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interpretation that makes her worse off than J3, the political
players will be able to agree to a response only between (J3) and P.67
Given this limitation, it is not clear that either the Senate or the
President will find it worthwhile to incur response costs.68 The
Senate is constrained by its own high response costs; the resulting
policy would need to be very close to S, albeit on either side, in
order to justify expenditure of rs. Similarly, the President’s rela-
tively lower response costs do not guarantee a response. The
President’s benefit from an override will be smallest because her
ideal point is closest to the proposed interpretation; she will only
incur her response costs, rp, if the resultant policy lies closer to her
ideal point than p*.69 Thus, depending on the bargaining power
distribution among the parties, it may be that no political player
has an obvious incentive to respond.70
iv. The Problem of Political Promise Keeping
The uncertainty inherent in Figure 7 is largely a function of the
simplifying single-iteration limitation I have imposed for clarity’s
sake. If instead the political parties are able to bargain credibly
with one another over time, then any cost distribution capable of
yielding net benefits for one or more political players should pro-
duce a statutory response.
Consider the Senate’s situation in Figure 7, for example. Because
its response costs are relatively high, the Senate will be willing to
67. The point (J3) represents the leftward equivalent of J3 from the President’s
perspective. She will veto any response to the left of (J3).
68. The House will not act because its best-case scenario, (J3), offers insufficient benefit
to cover its costs.
69. That equilibrium would of course lie to the left of P rather than the right. It is the
absolute distance that matters.
70. Even if every player’s cost function makes bargaining power relevant to the response
decision, it does not necessarily follow that the outcome is indeterminate. It is possible that
all policy space on the continuum—that is, the policies resulting from all possible
distributions of bargaining power—will be associated with one or more players who will find
it worthwhile to respond if policy is fixed there. Assuming the political players know the
distribution of bargaining power ex ante (a somewhat less objectionable claim than assuming
the Court knows the distribution of political bargaining power), these situations will result
in a response, even though each player’s own calculus will be affected by bargaining power
assessments. In Figure 7, there exists an “open space” such that if bargaining power fixed
policy within that range, no player would find it worthwhile to incur response costs, but it
is too complex to display graphically.
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incur those costs only in return for a final equilibrium relatively
close to its ideal point. And in a single-iteration world, the sunk cost
phenomenon would limit or eliminate the Senate’s willingness to
incur costs unless it could be guaranteed that result. 
Assume that the Senate is a relatively weak bargainer, such
that in a costless negotiation, policy would be fixed at J3.
Notwithstanding that fact, the House and President would both be
able to get something for nothing if the Senate offered to pull the
laboring oar and incur response costs in return for a policy that falls
right on the edge of the Senate’s response zone. That policy would
be better for both the President and the House than J3, completely
free of charge. 
However, the mechanics of the legislative process present a
problem for the Senate. Once the Senate has incurred its response
costs—that is, engaged in the necessary research, drafting, agenda
shuffling, et cetera—there is nothing to stop either the President or
the House from attempting to nudge the legislative bargain further
in their preferred direction. At that point, the Senate’s initial re-
sponse costs are sunk. If the other players can credibly threaten to
scuttle the deal, the Senate will have little choice but to go along,
lest it find itself in the worst possible situation: having expended its
response costs in return for no improvement in policy. Reasoning
backward from that possibility, the Senate is unlikely to incur its
response costs in the first place.
This phenomenon can be avoided, of course, if we assume that the
political players can make credible ex ante commitments to one
another. In the single-iteration context, each player’s goal is to
maximize its own policy satisfaction as to the interaction in ques-
tion, without regard to future consequences. But in the real world,
reputational constraints and repeat player phenomena would elim-
inate, or at least mitigate, the risk of one-off betrayal. In a repeat
player world, the availability of net benefits for at least one political
player should ultimately produce a legislative override to an objec-
tionable interpretation.
d. On the Importance of Backward Induction
Finally, note that the foregoing analysis assumes a risk-averse
Supreme Court—that is, a Court unwilling to face legislative
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override—with knowledge of the other players’ preferences and cost
functions. To the extent those assumptions hold, we would not
generally expect to see the Court prompting a legislative override
with its statutory interpretation opinions.71 Instead, the Court
would likely use its knowledge to avoid the response entirely,
picking the best possible interpretation, from its perspective, that
would ultimately be safe from revision.72 This principle applies to
the two-dimensional context as well.
II. EXPANDING THE MODEL TO TWO DIMENSIONS
Up to this point, I have assumed that statutory interpretation
takes place along a single policy dimension—in the examples, along
a preference continuum from fewer to more charter schools. But
single-dimension analysis is inherently limited.
Most statutory schemes inherently involve balancing of at least
two, and often many more, policy dimensions. For example, a
statute may be attempting to simultaneously eliminate racial
discrimination in employment73 while protecting small businesses
from overly burdensome regulation.74 Or, as in my hypothetical, a
generalized preference for fewer or more charter schools may
actually be a combination of two preferences—an abstract prefer-
ence for the ideal number of such schools and a preference for
higher or lower levels of federal funding for those schools. The
dimensions with which we may be most concerned in the statutory
interpretation context are not always purely political dimensions.
The involvement of judges in the analysis offers further support for
multidimensional analysis because many statutory interpretation
cases present specifically judicial policy dimensions.75 
71. See G. Dosi & M. Egidi, Substantive and Procedural Uncertainty: An Exploration of
Economic Behaviours in Changing Environments, 1 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 145 (1991)
(discussing different sources of uncertainty and how entities act in response to uncertainty).
As we add dimensions, the possession of information regarding preferences and costs may
be insufficient to allow the Court to plot a course because it is cognitively limited. In other
words, could the Court really do semidefinite programming?
72. See id. at 149.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
74. See id. § 2000e(b) (limiting application of Title VII to larger employers).
75. In this foundational paper, I assume that each player values each dimension equally.
I will relax this assumption in future work; that change will be particularly important when
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The addition of a second dimension to the analysis significantly
enriches the discussion in another important way. Specifically, the
more complex interplay of preferences and costs in two or more
dimensions will sometimes allow a self-interested Court to trade
losses in one dimension for gains in another. For example, when
conditions are right, the Court can improve its overall position by
selecting an interpretation that gives the nearest political player
more of what it wants relative to other players. This position offers
the Court protection from revision that would not be available if the
Court selected other dimensional combinations that are functionally
equivalent from the Court’s perspective.
That said, large segments of the unidimensional analysis in Part
I translate more or less directly to the two-dimensional context. I
will not recapitulate that analysis here. Rather, I present only a
small subset of the two-dimensional analysis materials that illus-
trates a key difference between the two-dimensional approach and
its single-dimension analogue.
A. Introduction by Way of a Charter School’s Backstory
Part I introduced the Article’s primary illustrating device: a
hypothetical debate about federal charter schools policy. In the
single-dimension context, it was not necessary to provide much in
the way of background on the hypothetical, but the two-dimensional
analysis is actually simplified by the introduction of additional
hypothetical facts:
In 2011, Congress passed, and the President enacted, a
federal charter schools statute that substantially increased the
amount of federal funding available to charter schools relative
to the amounts available under the No Child Left Behind Act
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The statute
also attempts to increase the absolute number of charter schools
by limiting the amount of federal funding for which any
individual charter school is eligible, and by providing short-term
tax incentives to new for-profit charter schools. But the political
we consider judicial policy dimensions—for example, workload, judicial independence, et
cetera—because courts are likely to value such matters differently than their political
counterparts.
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branches disagreed as to the likely effect of individual-facility
funding restrictions on the ultimate number of charter schools.
The text of the statute reflects that friction, prohibiting, without
explicit definition, only “excessive” funding of individual schools.
The statute also fails to specify federal funding levels, instead
expressing “authorized” expenditures as a percentage of “annual
gross domestic profit (GDP)” and leaving unresolved whether
expenditures are mandatory or discretionary. Lower court inter-
pretations were jumbled.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a
class action challenge to the current presidential adminis-
tration’s execution of the statute. The class consists of elemen-
tary and secondary students in failing public school districts
who claim that the Department of Education’s conservative
interpretation of “annual GDP” and its refusal to expend all
“authorized” funds violate the statute. According to the plain-
tiffs, proper application of the statute would encourage competi-
tion in the provision of educational services and would provide
plaintiffs with additional educational opportunities in the form
of more federally funded charter schools.
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Figure 8 depicts the absolute preferences of the current relevant
players in two dimensions76:
Compared to the current policy, Li—an amalgamation of the “deal”
reached when the statute was enacted, lower court interpretations
of that statute, and subsequent executive branch enforcement
activity—the President prefers roughly the same number of charter
76. These preferences are identical to those depicted in the zero-transaction-cost analysis
above. See, e.g., supra Figure 2.
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schools, but as a fiscal conservative, she would like to see less
federal funding. By contrast, the more consistently liberal House
prefers greater federal funding, and thus control, but with rela-
tively fewer charter schools. The Senate prefers both more schools
and higher levels of funding relative to the initial statute. 
By contrast, the Supreme Court is something of an outlier.
Perhaps in service to its commitment to federalism, the Court
would prefer a substantially higher number of charter schools than
even the Senate, but would prefer only an intermediate level of
federal funding, in between the level desired by the budget-hawk
President and a more fiscally liberal Congress.
If we ended the story there, the analysis would proceed in much
the same way as the transaction-cost-free unidimensional analysis
presented in Part II.77 But instead of concerning itself with the
arrangement of the three political players’ preferences on a line,
cost-free two-dimensional analysis is concerned primarily with the
triangle created by connecting points H, S, and P, HSP. This
triangle represents the entire policy space in which the political
players would be able to fix a new policy were they to negotiate a
new statute—whether in response to an objectionable judicial inter-
pretation or otherwise.
A player attempting to improve upon any status quo position on
or within the triangle can only do so at the cost of one or both of the
other players; because all three can and will veto any change that
worsens their lot, no change is possible once the existing policy is
located in or on the triangle. The self-interested Supreme Court
thus has a simple job in a cost-free world: to select the interpreta-
tion on the edge of the triangle that is closest to its own ideal
point.78 Any point outside the triangle will prompt a response from
the political branches, and any other point on or inside the triangle
needlessly cedes ground the Court does not have to surrender. In
Figure 8, the Supreme Court’s optimal zero-response-costs interpre-
tation is located at point J0.
77. For a thorough treatment of these issues without transaction costs, see Spiller, supra
note 16; Spiller & Gely, supra note 16.
78. See Spiller & Gely, supra note 16, at 467.
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But absolute preferences are only part of our story, and perhaps
the less important part as explained in these additional hypotheti-
cal facts:
Though the continued poor performance of U.S. public schools
makes the issue electorally important to both houses of
Congress and the President, each political player would face
different costs if it were to take it upon itself to respond to an
objectionable statutory interpretation from the Court.
The House’s response costs, rh, are lowest, because a subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce
has recently begun preliminary work on a revised federal
charter schools statute. Its work is far from complete, but it has
something of a head start on its counterparts in the Senate and
at the White House. 
The Senate’s costs, rs, are relatively higher. Though subcom-
mittees of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
& Pensions sporadically consider related issues, they have little
current expertise in this area. Moreover, the federal charter
schools policy debate is simply a little less important to the
Senate, relative to other matters to which it is currently
devoting its attention.
The President’s response costs, rp, are highest. Having just
taken office several months earlier, she only recently began
filling political positions within the Department of Education.
Those appointees are still getting up to speed, and charter
schools have not historically garnered much attention from
career Department of Education employees. Moreover, the
President is contending with a host of significant foreign policy
problems she inherited from her predecessor, and after a narrow
electoral victory, she is wary of an early political fight with the
Supreme Court.
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Figure 9 presents those costs in graphical terms:
B. Transaction Costs in Two Dimensions
1. The Circular Inaction Zone
As in the unidimensional context, the two-dimensional model
aggregates each political player’s response costs into a single
response-cost function.79 But in Figure 9, the cost functions are
circular rather than linear. To some degree, the circular shape is a
79. See supra Figures 5-7 and accompanying text.
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function of our operating assumptions. As before, we assume that
as we move away from a given player’s ideal point, that player’s
satisfaction goes down. We also again assume that we can measure
changes in player satisfaction occasioned by a given policy shift by
measuring the associated change in distance to player ideal
points.80 In the two-dimensional context, we further assume that
both preference dimensions, the number of schools and the level of
federal funding, are of equal importance to each player. Given these
assumptions, it is possible to represent each player’s response-cost
function graphically as a circular “inaction zone” centered upon that
player’s ideal point.81 
More precisely, the radius of each player’s inaction zone repre-
sents that player’s response costs translated into policy space
terms. This may seem a strange idea at first blush, but the intuition
is simple: there is some policy distance from each player’s ideal
point into which a judicial interpretation can fall without prompting
a discretion-eliminating response from that player. Each player-
specific inaction zone represents that distance relative to that
player’s ideal point. The larger the circle defining a player’s inaction
zone, the higher that player’s response costs. 
In a frictionless world, the political players would, perhaps
grudgingly, accept anything within the triangle as Pareto-optimal
but would respond to anything outside of the triangle. In a more
realistic world, a point outside the triangle but within a given
player’s inaction zone is not worth the effort of a discretion-
eliminating response from that player, though that same interpre-
tation may prompt another player to respond.
The perimeter of each inaction zone is an indifference curve of
sorts. The player is not genuinely indifferent between its ideal point
and points within or on the perimeter of its inaction zone; rather,
the player is indifferent between (1) any point on the perimeter of
its inaction zone and (2) incurring response costs to obtain its ideal
outcome. Thus, in Figure 9, even if a political player is guaranteed
that the end result will be a discretion-eliminating statute located
80. That is, preferences are again assumed to be unipeaked, linear, and Cartesian. See
supra note 51.
81. In future work, I will assess the implications that occur when political players do not
value policy dimensions equally. Among other things, the relevant inaction zones would no
longer be circular, but rather ellipsoidal.
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precisely at its own ideal point (a result far from guaranteed in
many political response negotiations involving multiple players),
that player will not incur response costs if the judicial interpreta-
tion falls on or inside its inaction zone. 
The approach can thus be summarized as follows: Faced with a
statutory interpretation fixing policy outside the political players’
Pareto triangle, those players will individually assess whether the
preference and cost dynamics they face justify a legislative override.
They will override the Court’s opinion legislatively if one or more of
the political players finds it worthwhile to incur its individual
response costs. If they act, one player will incur response costs,
generating a statute that (1) is mutually preferable to the judicial
interpretation for all three political players and (2) effectively
eliminates all judicial discretion. This in turn dictates that a self-
interested Supreme Court will select a judicial interpretation that
maximizes its own utility from among the set of interpretations that
will not provoke a legislative response.
2. Measuring Costs and Benefits in a Two-Dimensional World
Because the players’ utility functions are linear and because they
value each dimension equally, we can use each player’s inaction-
zone radius as a yardstick against which to measure the benefits of
a potential legislative override to that player. Some of these meas-
urements are easy. When a particular statutory interpretation lies
within a player’s inaction zone, for example, that player will make
no response, period. It would by definition cost more for that player
to fix the Court’s ruling than it would be worth in policy improve-
ment terms, even if the resulting statute established policy pre-
cisely at the player’s ideal point. The same player may well free ride
on another player’s investment by assenting to a Pareto-superior
response, of course, but it will not do the heavy lifting. 
Other comparisons are more difficult. For example, when a ju-
dicial interpretation falls outside of a player’s inaction zone, the
player will incur the expense of responding only if that expenditure
results in some net improvement in that player’s position. This is in
turn a function of the result of the response negotiation between
political players, a far more complicated analysis. But we can still
depict this situation graphically. As in the single-dimension model,
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if a player’s response costs—the radius of that player’s inaction
zone—are higher than the benefits, measured as the reduction in
absolute distance from the player’s ideal point resulting from the
response, then the player will not act. If that player’s response costs
are lower than the benefits, the player will respond. Thus, if the
dynamics of the interaction suggest that very little gross improve-
ment is possible for a particular player, that player may not be
willing to incur response costs, even though the interpretation in
question falls far outside its inaction zone.
The “gross improvement” question is complicated. Every judicial
interpretation establishes a new status quo, and that status quo
serves as an anchor of sorts for every veto player. Because every
player must assent to enact overriding legislation, no player will
accept a final result worse from its own perspective than the inter-
pretation’s new status quo. Thus, depending upon its location, a
judicial interpretation may change the range of possible legislative
responses such that the full Pareto triangle is no longer available
for negotiations among the political players. Veto players will not
be willing to worsen their situations by accepting a renegotiated
policy inferior to the new status quo imposed by the judicial
interpretation, even if they might have agreed to that policy in the
absence of a preexisting policy.
Finally, it is important to note the limits of the cost-to-policy-
space transformation. At the end of the day, there is some real,
quantifiable cost—in dollars, time, et cetera—to crafting a
discretion-eliminating response to an off-track judicial interpreta-
tion. By transforming that real cost into policy space terms, I am
simply depicting the absolute improvement in policy that a given
player would have to see in order to justify incurring that real
cost.82
82. The simplifying assumptions of the model mask the implications of this limitation
somewhat. In particular, the circularity assumption—that all players value both dimensions
equally—allows for a purely Cartesian analysis. If we relax the circularity requirement, the
math becomes substantially more difficult, although the underlying point remains the same.
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C. A Special Feature of Two Dimensions
1. Introduction
The preference distributions and response costs depicted in
Figure 9 demonstrate a unique feature of multidimensional
analysis: a self-interested Supreme Court can sometimes play the
political branches off one another.83 Specifically, the Court can pick
among multiple judicial interpretations of equivalent value.84 Put
another way, a Court interested in testing whether it can obtain a
particular level of net utility can select any point of equal distance
from the Court’s own ideal point. This in turn means that the Court
can trade off one dimension for another, thereby obtaining “protec-
tion” from a nearby political player in the form of an interpretation
more attractive to that player than other combinations that are
utility equivalent from the Court’s perspective. 
In the following examples, I present three possible judicial
interpretations of the charter schools statute. In some ways, the
analysis parallels that presented in the unidimensional analysis, in
that I identify an “untenable” interpretation, a “safe” interpretation,
and an “indeterminate” interpretation.85 In the unidimensional
context, however, each of the three interpretations considered was
of substantially different value to the Court.86 Moreover, the
unidimensional political players’ cost functions were different in
each diagram.87
83. Again, although I describe the Court as acting deliberately and strategically, the
analysis generally applies even when, as is probably more often the case, the Court’s off-track
opinion is a function of mistake rather than malevolence. If the Court deviates because it is
mistaken about political preferences, it admittedly will not have engaged in backward
induction to pick a “safe” interpretation. Even in that situation, however, a “mistaken but
durable” interpretation tells us a lot about the political players’ response costs. 
84. Conceptually, this is similar, if not directly analogous, to the “production possibility
frontier” familiar to undergraduate economics students. See Urs Luterbacher & Pierre Allen,
Modeling Politico-Economic Interactions Within and Between Nations, 3 INT’L POL. SCI. REV.
404, 409-10 (1982). Here, though, the Court selects interpretations from among different
combinations of guns and butter (or number of and funding levels for charter schools) that
are equivalent from the Court’s perspective.
85. See supra Part I.B.2.c.i-iii.
86. That is, closer to or farther from the Court’s ideal point. See supra Figures 5-7.
87. See supra Figures 5-7.
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In the two-dimensional context, by contrast, the three interpre-
tations I present are of equal value to the Court, and these three
different interpretations are untenable, safe, or indeterminate
despite the fact that the underlying preference and cost dynamics
are also the same in each case. The only thing that changes is the
interpretations considered by the Court from among a set of what
it considers functionally identical alternatives. The following two-
dimensional examples thus demonstrate a self-interested Court’s
enhanced ability to privilege its own preferences in a multidimen-
sional context.88
In a world with transaction costs, the Court will consider only
interpretations that improve its outcome over its transaction-cost-
free optimum point, J0, in Figure 8. Thus, the universe of interpre-
tations the Supreme Court will consider is the shaded disc in Figure
10 below, representing all points closer to SC than J0: 
88. This is subject to the Court’s own cognitive limits. See supra notes 66, 71 and
accompanying text.
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Whether the Court could sustain an interpretation outside the
shaded circle is irrelevant because any such interpretation would
by definition be inferior to its best safe interpretation, J0. Thus, if
the Court tries to take advantage of congressional or presidential
response costs, it will do so only if it can set policy within the
shaded disc. All else equal, it will select the point closest to SC
within the circle that is also durable.
Two factors complicate any attempt to depict graphically the
actual outcome of a particular statutory interpretation scenario.
First, recall that the specific outcome of any response negotiation
is often a function of the relative bargaining power of the House,
Senate, and President. Thus, we can sometimes identify only a
range of possible outcomes within HSP that are on the table in
that negotiation, rather than a final, specific result.89
Second, more aggressive and less realistic informational assump-
tions do not solve that informational problem. Each possible Court
interpretation in the policy space establishes a new and potentially
different status quo backdrop in whose shadow the House, Senate,
and President must negotiate the terms of their response. Even if
the Court could identify the precise mix of bargaining power among
the political players for the issue under consideration, it would still
have to cycle through all possible interpretations to identify its
utility-maximizing safe interpretation. 
Thus, even if we assume that the Court is capable of identifying
the balance of power between the House, Senate, and President
such that it can predict with precision the outcome of any statutory
renegotiation given a particular interpretation,90 a spatial model
can predict only whether a response to that particular interpreta-
tion will provide net benefits to any player if it incurs response
costs. Given a robust and reliable understanding of the bargaining
89. There are simpler cases for which it is possible to identify either specific, judicially
ideal interpretations, or at least a true “safety zone” in which the Court can improve upon
J0 without any risk of response. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
90. This leaves aside the very real difficulties in operationalizing that knowledge in the
context of a three-party negotiation over an irregularly shaped two-dimensional policy space
of the sort this analysis typically yields.
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power issue, we could identify the best possible statutory interpre-
tation(s) from the Court’s perspective by trial and error; but there
is no easy way to identify such point(s) graphically.91
Nonetheless, the inability to predict a final equilibrium spatially
does not render the spatial approach useless. By assessing the
political players’ response calculus for specific points in the policy
space, the spatial model can demonstrate the potential for increased
judicial discretion in the multidimensional context.
2. Three Differently Identical Interpretations
In the two-dimensional context, a self-interested Supreme Court
can sometimes use the interplay of those dimensions to its benefit.
In the examples that follow, the Court is considering three possible
interpretations of the hypothetical federal charter schools statute.92
Importantly, each of these interpretations is equivalent from the
Court’s perspective; though they represent different mixes of
funding levels and generalized numerical preferences, each is the
same distance away from SC, and accordingly the Court would be
equally satisfied with any of the three.
The first interpretation under consideration, J1, would signifi-
cantly increase federal incentives to establish charter schools
relative to the inherited policy but would decrease federal funding
levels substantially for those schools relative to the status quo. To
flesh out the hypothetical a bit, imagine interpretation J1 holding
that the Department of Education retains substantial discretion to
determine whether to disburse “authorized” funds to charter schools
(thus decreasing federal funding levels relative to the status quo)
while simultaneously defining as presumptively “excessive” any
amount of funding for a single facility greater than $3000.00 per
91. In future work, I will explore solutions to this problem. In general terms, this
scenario presents a problem for “semidefinite programming,” a subset of convex optimization
theory. Lieven Vandenberghe & Stephen Boyd, Semidefinite Programming, 38 SIAM REV.
49, 49 (1996). Applying semidefinite programming techniques permits the solution of far
more complex multidimensional problems and also allows for consideration of elliptical cost
functions, such as variations in the ways different players value the different dimensions of
the problem. But it also introduces a level of technical complexity well beyond the scope of
this Article. 
92. See supra Part II.A.
1294 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1251
authorized student (thus tending to increase the absolute number
of charter schools/charter school students).
By contrast, the second interpretation, J2, would significantly
increase federal funding levels for charter schools, perhaps by
holding that the Department of Education must justify any failure
to expend “authorized” funds in some fashion. It would also tend to
increase the number of charter schools, but not by so much as the
first interpretation. This interpretation might hold that funding of
more than $4000.00 per authorized student is presumptively
“excessive” under the statute.
Finally, the third possible interpretation, J3, falls somewhere in
between the first two interpretations. It would encourage a small
increase in federal funding by nudging, but not requiring, the
Department of Education to expend “authorized” funds,93 while
deciding that more than $3500.00 per authorized student in federal
funding is presumptively “excessive.” A graphical depiction of these
alternatives appears in Figure 11 below:
93. The Court is particularly good at nudging. See infra Part III.C.2.
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Note that all three interpretations are better from the Court’s
perspective than the definitionally safe interpretation J0.94
Moreover, all three points are equivalent from the Court’s perspec-
tive: the Court would derive the same utility from each interpreta-
tion because each is the same distance away from the Court’s ideal
point.95 
94. In other words, they are closer to SC than J0. This also necessarily means that all
three fall outside of HSP, and that all three would be untenable in a world without response
costs.
95. Technically, all three points lie on the same “isopreference” circle centered upon point
SC. See Wayne S. DeSarbo et al., A Parametric Multidimensional Unfolding Procedure for
Incomplete Nonmetric Preference/Choice Set Data in Marketing Research, 34 J. MARKETING
RES. 499, 500 (1997).
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The Court’s perspective, however, is not the only one that
matters. Once we take the other players’ preferences and incentives
into account, we find that each interpretation yields a different
result. Application of the model demonstrates that the Court
would be unable to sustain interpretation J1 regardless of
House/Senate/President bargaining power dynamics. The first in-
terpretation would necessarily lead to a statutory override spear-
headed by the House, whose worst-case response outcome would
still justify incurring response costs. 
The Court would, however, be able to sustain interpretation J2,
again regardless of political player bargaining power. The political
players cannot override the second potential interpretation because
no political player’s best-case scenario justifies expenditure of
response costs. 
Finally, the third interpretation offers an indeterminate outcome;
the Court’s ability to select that policy would depend upon the
precise distribution of bargaining power among political players and
the intrinsic dynamics of the political players’ negotiations. Under
some possible distributions and assumptions, interpretation J3
would draw no legislative response, whereas under others it would.
Under still others, it would be impossible to predict the outcome in
the context of a single-iteration interaction.
a. An Unworkable Interpretation
Point J1 represents a policy within the overlap region that is
from the Court’s perspective somewhat better (closer to SC) than
policy J0, though it represents a rather significant shift in dimen-
sional priorities compared to the Court’s zero-response-cost safe-
haven interpretation. Interpretation J1 would significantly reduce
federal funding for charter schools relative to J0, but it would
simultaneously increase the number of charter schools somewhat. 
To determine whether this interpretation is sustainable, we must
first identify the range of possible political response outcomes. This
range is in part defined by the now-familiar Pareto triangle con-
necting H, S, and P; but it is also influenced by the location of J1
itself. Because no political player will be willing to accept any
statutory response that worsens its lot relative to J1, the actual
2013] CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE 1297
range over which the House, Senate, and President will be able to
agree is somewhat smaller than HSP: 
The crosshatched region in Figure 12 represents the range of
possible outcomes of a response negotiation between the House,
Senate, and President, given the Court’s selection of point J1.96
96. Recall that the Court’s interpretation establishes a new status quo that may affect
the range of possible statutory outcomes. See supra Part II.B.2. See Figures 11-12 and
accompanying text for an explanation of how to identify the renegotiation region.
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From the House’s perspective, any point within HSP is better than
J1, that is closer to H than J1, so the House’s veto right will not
constrain the political parties’ bargaining. But there are points
within HSP that are worse for both the Senate and President, as
they lie farther from their respective ideal points, than J1. The
crosshatched region is the portion of HSP that would be better for
all three political players than J1; neither the House nor the Senate
or President will veto any of the points within that region.
Once the range of possible agreements is identified, it remains to
determine whether that range can or must produce a legislative
override. Whether a given interpretation will elicit a statutory
response is determined by (1) the relative bargaining power of the
House, Senate, and President and (2) given that bargaining power,
whether any player can improve its net position by incurring
response costs. In the case of J1, however, the precise bargaining
power distribution is irrelevant to the analysis. The cost-benefit
dynamics alone are such that a statutory response is a certainty.
Specifically, J1 will elicit a response from the House even if the
House fares as badly as possible in the ensuing renegotiation. The
House’s worst-case outcome when response bargaining with the
President and Senate is the point within the bargaining range that
is farthest away from the House’s own ideal point H. Given the
preference and cost distributions of the hypothetical, the House’s
worst-case outcome is located on the line segment connecting the
senatorial and presidential ideal points, very close to the Senate’s
own ideal point, represented by point Hwc in Figure 13 below:
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Because the political players’ utility functions are linear, we can
assess a player’s change in utility from a particular policy change—
in this case, moving from interpretation J1 to the House’s worst-
case negotiated-response policy Hwc—by mapping that change on a
line originating at the player’s ideal point and running through the
player’s worst-case scenario. 
The point Uh(J1) in Figure 13 is the same distance from H as
interpretation J1; it thus has the same utility to the House as J1.
Point Uh(J1) is also on the same line as H and Hwc; thus the distance
between Uh(J1) and Hwc represents the House’s improvement in
utility if the political parties negotiate a response to the Court’s
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interpretation, and the House fares as badly as possible in that
negotiation. Note that the House’s response costs, rh, are lower
(shorter) than the benefit of moving from Uh(J1) to Hwc. Because
even a worst-case negotiation will improve the House’s position by
more than its own response costs, interpretation J1 is not a viable
option for a Court seeking a durable self-interested interpretation.
We could similarly ask whether the Senate’s or President’s worst-
case response-negotiation scenarios would merit the expenditure of
their response costs. Those analyses would be redundant, however,
because only one political player needs to find it worthwhile to
respond to render an interpretation untenable from the Court’s
perspective. Regardless, the specific dynamics of interpretation J1
provide easy answers to these questions. 
Recall that the crosshatched response range is substantially
smaller than HSP, and that the arcs intersecting the triangle to
form that region are a function of the President’s and Senate’s
unwillingness to do worse than J1 in a response negotiation. If
either the Senate or the President was to do as badly as possible in
the response negotiation, they would by definition find themselves
at points utility equivalent to the new judicial status quo, J1. Since
either can have J1 without incurring response costs by simply
vetoing any response, they will not be willing to bid against them-
selves in that way. Thus, the House’s costs and incentives alone
dictate the outcome in this scenario.
b. A Safe Interpretation
The Court’s second possible interpretation, J2, represents the
same slight improvement for the Court over J0. Unlike the Court’s
first option, J2 is safe from congressional override, regardless of the
distribution of bargaining power among the House, Senate, and
President. To understand why, we must turn our attention from
worst-case scenarios to best-case scenarios. An interpretation is
guaranteed to be safe for the Court if no player’s best possible
outcome improves its position by more than its response costs.
Given the location of J2 and the distribution of political players’
preferences and costs, there exists only a tiny sliver of policy space
—the miniscule crosshatched half lens created by the intersection
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of HSP and the Senate’s and President’s J2-equivalent indifference
curves in Figure 14—in which the political players may be able to
locate a mutually superior statutory response: 
Given the tiny maximum improvements available to either the
Senate or the President as a result of a response negotiation, nei-
ther of those players will be willing to incur its own more significant
response costs, even if it was to do as well as possible in the re-
sponse negotiation. 
The House presents a closer call, but the answer is the same:
even if the House has all the bargaining power and thus does as
well as possible in the response negotiation, the improvement it
would experience in moving from J2 to its best-case outcome would
not cover its costs:
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As Figure 15 demonstrates, the House’s utility improvement in
moving from J2 to its best-case negotiation outcome Hbc is less than
its response costs, rh.97 Thus, no political player has any incentive
to incur response costs in connection with interpretation J2; there-
fore, the Court’s interpretation here would be safe from political
override.
97. As in Figure 13, the point Uh(J2) represents the House’s utility equivalent to point J2,
but it is along the same line as H and Hbc for ease of comparison.
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c. An Indeterminate Interpretation?
In addition to areas within the Court’s possible improvement
zone that are either clearly safe or clearly off limits, there exist a
number of possible interpretations in which the outcome may
depend on the precise distribution of bargaining power and the
negotiation dynamics among the political players. The Court’s third
potential interpretation, J3, falls into that category.
i. On Bargaining Power Alone
This third possible interpretation lies relatively close to the
second interpretation under consideration; accordingly, the story is
again the same with respect to the Senate and President. Although
the possible response range for interpretation J3 is a bit larger than
the miniscule response range available for interpretation J2, the J3
response range does not offer enough potential benefits to justify
the Senate’s or the President’s expenditure of response costs.98 This
is true regardless of bargaining power distribution because the
potential benefits to those players of moving from J3 to any point
within the crosshatched area are too low even under best-case con-
ditions:
98. Similar to the analysis of interpretation J2, the House’s response calculus is
irrelevant to the identification of the response range because the House would be willing to
accept any response to interpretation J3 that is mutually acceptable to the President and
Senate; from the House’s perspective, the vast majority of HSP is preferable to J3.
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Whether the House will be willing to incur response costs is far less
certain. Assume first that the House has all of the bargaining
power, such that the political response negotiation yields the
House’s best-case policy, Hbc, the point closest to H in the response
range depicted in Figure 17:
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If the House obtains its best-case outcome, it will experience an
increase in utility from J3 to Hbc that is greater than response costs,
rh. As before, this increase can be measured by identifying the J3-
equivalent point on the line connecting the House’s ideal point H
and its best-case outcome, Lhbc. Because the distance between
Uhbc(J3) and Hbc is greater than rh, the House will incur response
costs if it holds all the cards during response negotiations.
If the Senate or President dominates the response negotiation,
the House’s course of action is less clear. In Figure 17, the point Hwc
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represents the House’s worst-case negotiation outcome—a state of
affairs consistent with the President holding all of the bargaining
power. If the dynamics of the response negotiation are such that the
President can and will use that power to insist upon her best
possible outcome, then the House will not find it worthwhile to
incur response costs. The improvement from Uhwc(J3) to Hwc would
be insufficient to cover the House’s costs. Thus, on the basis of these
two possible bargaining power distributions alone, the viability of
interpretation J3 is indeterminate.
ii. The Problem of Political Promise Keeping Revisited
Things do not necessarily get much clearer when it is assumed
that the Court has complete and perfect information regarding the
distribution of political bargaining power. Though knowledge that
the House is in the driver’s seat would allow the Court to anticipate
a legislative response to interpretation J3, knowledge that the
President or Senate would dominate a response negotiation would
be far less helpful.
This is because the House is in some ways the only relevant
player in the single-iteration interaction initiated when the Court
selects interpretation J3. As acknowledged, neither the Senate nor
the President will ever lift a finger to respond to J3 independently,
even though each may be willing to free ride on the House’s efforts.
The operative question therefore is whether the House will act.
Even if the bargaining power distribution is such that the House is
not guaranteed a net benefit from incurring response costs, we
cannot say with certainty that the House will remain silent. As in
the linear examples in Part I, there are policy positions within the
possible response range that would provide a net benefit to the
House after incurring response costs—if the House knows it can fix
policy in one of those locations.99
The inquiry now is whether the House, Senate, and President can
reach some compact whereby the House agrees to surrender some
or almost all of its potential net benefit by drafting a response less
House-preferable than its best-case scenario but acceptable to the
Senate and President, in return for the Senate’s and President’s
99. See supra Figures 5-7.
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agreement to accept that compromise. At first blush, this appears
to be a win-win-win scenario for all three political players: (1) the
response falls within the response range, or is better for all political
players than J3; (2) the House has expended less than its net
benefits to obtain that response; and (3) the President and the
Senate have gotten something for nothing.
At the same time, however, the sequential nature of the
negotiation—the House first incurs response costs to draft a
discretion-eliminating statute, then seeks approval from the Senate
and President through the traditional Article I, Section 7 pro-
cess100—again presents a potentially confounding sunk cost issue.
Assume the House has incurred its response costs drafting detailed,
discretion-eliminating legislation that fixes the level of federal
charter schools funding precisely and explicitly limits the number
of charter schools relative to interpretation J3 by establishing strict
and detailed eligibility requirements for federal tax incentives.
Further assume the House’s response accurately represents the
terms of a prebrokered deal between the House, Senate, and
President that reflects both (1) the bargaining power advantages of
the Senate and President and (2) the House’s need for its benefits
to at least cover its costs.
In a single-iteration interaction, it would now be rational, but
admittedly longitudinally destabilizing, for the Senate or President
to refuse to accept the House’s bill without a few additional
changes—changes that would move federal charter schools policy
further away from the House’s break-even point. Having already
incurred its response costs, the House would then be in a bit of a
jam. If it refuses to budge, it risks a truly horrible outcome: policy
may remain at J3, and the House will have spent rh for no benefit
whatsoever. And because its response costs are sunk, the House
may ultimately choose to agree to the proposed modifications, even
though it would not have incurred response costs in the first place
had it known that would be the result. Accordingly, if the House
anticipates betrayal by either the Senate or the President, it may
choose not to expend response costs even though a mutually
beneficial response exists.101 
100. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
101. The introduction of repeat-iteration analysis may help address this problem, as
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As in the unidimensional context, the likelihood of betrayal
almost certainly goes down in a repeat player environment in which
reputational bonding and longstanding relationships between the
political players would tend to decrease the incentives for that sort
of behavior. At the same time, however, it is likely that the sunk-
cost risk dynamic plays some role even in the more complicated real
world; political actors who invest heavily by carrying the laboring
oar on legislation almost certainly worry that they will lose some of
their position in postdrafting negotiations.
III. AMPLIFICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
This Article is largely descriptive; for the most part, I have
simply taken each political player’s response costs as a given and
then analyzed the results. Thus, a comprehensive treatment of the
implications of the model lies well beyond the scope of the current
project. Nonetheless, a brief closing discussion of several additional
issues is warranted. In this Part, I briefly address (1) the general
approach to identifying and categorizing the political players’
response costs, (2) the extent to which the model and interest group
theory interact, and (3) the model’s potential application to several
real-world contexts.
A. Categorizing Response Costs
To this point, I have deliberately remained vague as to the details
of the political players’ response-cost functions. I avoid this dis-
cussion in part because a full analysis of the various components of
a player’s response costs lies beyond the scope of this Article; the
primary point of this foundational discussion is to identify the
potential effects of response costs without extensive analysis of their
determinants. 
For the primary purposes of this Article, it is therefore generally
enough to know that (1) political players face response costs if they
players would be forced to consider the reputational consequences of their actions. For an
introduction to the repeat player analysis, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). But within
the context of a single-iteration game, the outcome associated with interpretation J3 may
well be unknowable.
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wish to respond to an undesirable judicial interpretation, and (2)
those response costs may, and likely will, differ from player to
player.
At the same time, however, a brief discussion of several broad
categories of response costs is helpful in several ways. First, it helps
to make concrete some of the abstract cost-related difficulties asso-
ciated with legislative overrides to objectionable judicial inter-
pretations. In addition, meaningful discussion of the prescriptive
implications of the model—something I mostly leave to others— is
inherently dependent upon an understanding of the various com-
ponents of the political players’ response costs. Leading theories of
statutory interpretation, for example, may well suggest different
normative treatment of nominally objectionable judicial interpreta-
tions, depending upon the underlying sources of the players’ re-
sponse costs.
The following sketch of the basic categories of response costs will
help inform those analyses. In general terms, I break the political
players’ intrinsic response-cost functions into three categories:
(1) process costs, (2) search and specificity costs, and (3) opportunity
costs. 
1. Process Costs
The U.S. legislative process is, by design and evolution, both
complex and difficult to navigate. The Constitution itself creates a
deliberately cumbersome regulatory apparatus, and internal legis-
lative procedures that have developed over time have typically only
added to the complexity. Regardless of the normative desirability of
such a system, few will deny that it is costly.102
The process costs attendant with legislation fall into two general
subcategories. Some costs are essentially fixed; these costs are
associated with almost every affirmative legislative action. If a
unanimous Congress and President wanted to pass a statute de-
claring that “Old Glory Blue is one of the three colors on the
American flag,”103 it would still involve any number of costly steps
102. See HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 164-65 (explaining the legislative process and
its complications).
103. See U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., DDD-F-416F, FEDERAL SPECIFICATION: FLAG,
NATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND FLAG, UNION JACK § 3.5 (2005).
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to move that bill through both chambers and to the President’s desk
for signature.104 Relative to other categories of cost, these fixed costs
of legislation likely do not provide much in the way of additional
discretion to an interpreting court, but they are a real, if relatively
minor, component of the political players’ cost functions.
The other category of process costs is somewhat more interesting,
and may more often be relevant in our analyses of judicial discre-
tion. The legislative process is riddled with various gatekeeper
nodes—committee and subcommittee chairs, in particular—that can
raise the costs of legislation substantially. There will necessarily be
an imperfect match between committee and subcommittee chair
preferences and those of the full chambers they serve. Committee
chairs acquire their posts on the basis of myriad factors; even at the
subcommittee level, Congress is insufficiently differentiated to
ensure that median or key member preferences as to any specific
issue will necessarily be reflected in the chair herself. 
For example, the Chair of the House Committee on Agriculture
may generally prefer to limit farm subsidies on ideological grounds
but may simultaneously express a strong preference for the ethanol
subsidies on which her state’s corn farmers rely. In such cases, the
committee system itself may impose not only systemic costs but
also costs specific to the issue under consideration. A legislative
response to a liberal, pro-ethanol-subsidy judicial interpretation of
an agriculture bill may enjoy broad support from both chambers
and the President, and nonetheless face difficulty because the
relevant committee chair’s own idiosyncratic preferences get in the
way.
2. Search and Specificity Costs
The model assumes that both the Court and the political players
can identify their preferred outcomes with precision; each player’s
ideal point is a representation of that outcome in policy space
terms. But being able to place a pin at a particular point on a pref-
erence map is not the same as effective codification of that prefer-
ence. It is not enough to simply locate the nominal preferences of
the political players. Nor is it sufficient to locate the nominal result
104. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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of a response negotiation between those players. Rather, we must
acknowledge that the political players will find it costly both to
research and then codify the response in a way that effectively
constrains the Court. 
For any expected legislative response, the costs of determining
precisely how to give effect to that response may vary both from
high to low and from player to player. Two key variables in part
determine each player’s search and specificity costs: (1) that
player’s background and expertise in the regulatory subject matter,
and (2) the inherent linguistic complexity associated with giving an
effective, discretion-eliminating voice to a legislative override.
A political player’s search and specificity costs will be lower, all
else equal, the greater that player’s relevant background and exper-
tise. A congressional committee with substantial experience in a
particular area will generally find it less costly to research that
area and to prepare legislation that accurately and effectively
expresses legislative preferences. By contrast, a generalist White
House staffer tasked with proposing blank-slate legislation in
connection with an issue outside the traditional jurisdiction of
executive branch agencies may face a remarkably steep—and thus
costly—learning curve, simply to get up to speed on the issue. 
Thus, it is likely that expertise-and-experience-driven search and
specificity costs will vary substantially among and between the
House, Senate, and President on an issue-by-issue basis. Whether
by historical accident or for some other reason, expertise is not
distributed equally among the political branches as to each issue.
Rather, for true blank-slate legislation, we would generally expect
to see (1) broadly lower costs for the legislative chambers relative
to the executive branch because Congress serves as the primary
drafter of most initial legislation and (2) some additional cost-
lowering specialization among the three political players on a topic-
by-topic basis. For legislation whose subject matter overlaps more
with the traditional domain of an existing executive branch agency,
we might expect the roles to be reversed.
The inherent linguistic complexity of expressing a given policy is
another significant determinant of search and specificity costs.
Different regulatory problems and different regulatory solutions
may require quite different levels of linguistic specificity to effec-
tively divest the courts of interpretive discretion. Return again to
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the charter schools hypothetical. It may be quite costly for Congress
to specify an intermediate position representing a preference for a
moderately high number of charter schools and a moderately high
level of federal funding. It may, for example, take substantial
research to identify the precise language needed to give effect to the
preferred policy, especially when that language is intended to drive
the primary behavior of third parties. 
For example, assume that Congress wishes to increase the
number of charter schools by 3000 over the next five years.
Assuming that Congress in fact possesses the tools necessary to
encourage the desired amount of growth, it still may be quite costly
for Congress to figure out what level of tax incentives or single-
institution funding cap will yield the correct result. Moreover, the
requisite statutory language itself may be quite detailed and
complex.
By contrast, it may be much less costly for the political players to
give voice to a more extreme preference. A political apparatus
broadly antagonistic to charter schools along both dimensions may
be able to give effective expression to its collective preferences with
considerably less research and with concomitantly less investment
in legislative drafting.
More generally, we would expect complexity-driven search and
specificity costs to increase in direct proportion to both the inherent
regulatory complexity of the underlying problem and the inherent
complexity of the political players’ negotiated response to the
objectionable interpretation. Thus, the classic debate over rules and
standards rears its head here.105 To the extent the existing litera-
ture on rules and standards discusses promulgation costs at all, it
typically adopts the conventional wisdom that discretion-granting
105. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Lawrence
B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, and Principles, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON (Apr. 15, 2012), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_
theory_le_3.html; see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 15-21 (Illini Books
ed. 1971) (explaining why most court decisions are based on judicial discretion rather than
rules); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISON-MAKING IN THE LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) (analyzing rules as probalistic
generalizations); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (examining the “conditions under which greater
specificity or greater generality is the efficient choice” in the legal process based on a cost-
benefit analysis).
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standards are less costly to enact than deterministic rules because
they require less detailed research and negotiation.106 This is true,
as far as it goes. But recall that the objective in our situation is to
draft discretion-eliminating legislation in response to an objection-
able judicial interpretation. Thus, the first rules-versus-standards
question here is whether, agency costs aside, the regulatory problem
in question is objectively better suited to rule regulation or stan-
dard regulation. The second, related question is whether the polit-
ical players’ response preference is sufficiently extreme to mitigate
or eliminate the difficulties associated with a discretion-constrain-
ing statutory response.
Using somewhat shopworn examples to illustrate the point,
consider two hypothetical federal statutes, one prohibiting driving
at an “unsafe speed” on interstate highways, and one prohibiting
“fraud in the marketing or sale of federally registered securities.”
Now assume the Supreme Court has recently issued opinions
interpreting each statute. In the first, the Court declares that 100
miles-per-hour is presumptively a reasonable speed for interstate
highway travel. In the second, the Court holds that the fraud
statute does not apply to sales to “sophisticated investors” like the
high-income physician plaintiffs in the case before the Court.
The political players’ search- and specificity-driven response costs
will vary for each scenario, both as a function of the underlying
problem and as a function of the negotiated legislative response. In
the “unsafe speed” example, problem-related search and specificity
costs would likely be quite low. Even accounting for error costs, it
should be relatively inexpensive for the political players to identify
one or more discretion-eliminating maximum speeds for interstate
highway drivers. Those costs will also rise or fall depending upon
the precise preferences of the political players. If the House, Senate,
and President all place high value on highway safety and low value
on economic activity, they may be comfortable passing a more re-
strictive, highly deterministic statute: “It shall be unlawful for
motor vehicles to travel on interstate highways at any speed greater
than 35 miles-per-hour.”
106. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
557 (1992); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983).
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If the political players have intermediate views, or as here, if the
two preference dimensions stand in potential tension with one
another, it may be somewhat more costly to pass a discretion-
eliminating statute that effectively gives voice to political prefer-
ences. For example, the statute might need to differentiate between
types of traffic, times of day, weather conditions, and location of
roadway, for example. It might also require a much higher invest-
ment in information to identify the optimal linguistic expression of
political preference along broadly defined dimensions like “highway
safety” and “economic activity,” including, for example, extensive
empirical research on both the commercial and safety implications
of various potential speed limit regimes.
In the securities fraud context, the inherent search and specific-
ity costs associated with the problem are likely somewhat higher
than for the speed limit example. In general terms, whether a party
has committed fraud is more typically determined on a case-by-case
basis. Even with respect to identification of covered victims, the
reliance requirement of the common law prima facie case suggests
a certain ambiguity for which judicial discretion might be particu-
larly appealing in a world without agency costs. Compared to the
speed limit example, we might expect the baseline search and spec-
ificity costs associated with correcting an objectionable judicial
interpretation of the fraud statute to be somewhat higher.
But as with the speed limit example, the extremity of the political
players’ views is also highly relevant. In worlds in which the polit-
ical players wish to protect all or no victims, regardless of their
level of sophistication, the statutory fix will be less costly than in a
world in which political preferences are more nuanced.
3. Opportunity Costs
The House, Senate, and President also face opportunity costs
when they consider responding to an objectionable Supreme Court
interpretation. The time and resources the political players devote
to a specific legislative override cannot be used for other matters;
it is thus appropriate that our response-cost functions account for
the opportunities foregone by each political actor if it chooses to
respond to the Court’s implicit provocation.
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It is admittedly a bit difficult to identify precisely where search
and specificity costs end and opportunity costs begin—yet another
reason why I avoid detailed definition of response-cost functions.
For example, there is at least some evidence that the political
branches remain functionally unaware of some Supreme Court
statutory interpretation opinions, or at least choose not to invest
heavily in determining whether the opinions merit a response.107
Moreover, a political player’s opportunity costs likely will correlate
somewhat with its search and specificity costs, insofar as those
costs inform the player’s internal calculus regarding what it must
give up to respond to the Court.
At the same time, however, opportunity costs deserve separate
treatment, because the concept captures political preference inten-
sity relative to other issues not up for consideration, a variable
wholly missing from earlier attempts to model judicial discretion.
In general terms, opportunity costs should be inversely correlated
with intensity of preference. That is, the more intensely a political
actor cares about a particular issue, the lower its opportunity costs
of responding. The less it cares, the higher those costs.
As with search and specificity costs, opportunity costs will also
vary both by issue and player. Returning to the securities fraud
hypothetical above, it is plausible to imagine a scenario in which
the President, facing significant foreign policy challenges, and a
Senate, concerned with overhauling regulation of the financial
sector, will face relatively higher opportunity costs than a House
recently elected largely on the back of popular perception that
corporations engage in systemic fraud. All three players might have
similar nominal preferences, well to the political left of the Court’s,
but their individual response costs will also vary as a function of
their remaining agenda, et cetera.
The foregoing discussion deliberately takes a snapshot approach
consistent with the single-interaction focus of the model. I therefore
bracket for the time being the challenges associated with quantify-
ing a political player’s response costs in a world in which the player
cares simultaneously about contemporaneously desirable political
outcomes and about being able to credibly promise important
107. See JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 9, at 253-88.
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constituencies durable legislative bargains.108 In theory, I could
handle this problem in several ways, but the analysis may become
quite complicated, because it might require adjustment of either the
player’s ideal point or of its response costs as a function of the
location of the judicial interpretation itself. This would make both
the game theory and the underlying mathematics substantially
more difficult without significant additional descriptive payoff.
B. The Influence of Interest Groups
To this point, I have assumed that the political players’ response
costs are entirely internal. But both the lessons of practical
experience and the insights of public choice theory teach that
interest groups may be able to influence political response costs by
placing a thumb on one side of the scale or the other.109
The conventional interest group theory account generally ana-
lyzes campaign contributions and other electorally focused interest
group conduct in an attempt to understand the influence wielded by
interest groups in the legislative process.110 But any discussion of
this type of interest group involvement in the statutory interpreta-
tion game would effectively import repeat player concerns through
the back door, because a political player affected by interest group
pressure of that sort would necessarily be looking ahead to the
longitudinal costs or benefits of legislative action or inaction. 
I therefore focus instead on the ways in which interest groups
might directly affect the political response costs associated with our
standard single-iteration game. In general, sufficiently motivated
interest groups will be able to either raise or lower the response
costs associated with a potential legislative override. But we would
not expect their ability to raise or lower costs to be distributed
symmetrically; rather, it will typically be the case that interest
groups can lower political response costs more effectively than they
can raise them.
An interest group focused on obtaining a legislative override of an
objectionable Court interpretation can lower political response costs
108. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 877-78 (discussing legislative bargains).
109. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 12-37.
110. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-36 (1991).
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by subsidizing the political players’ search and specificity costs. As
an intensely interested subject-matter expert, the interest group
has both the incentive and the ability to invest cost-effectively in
the promulgation of legislation. It is therefore hardly surprising
that interest groups often present “plug and play” legislation for
congressional consideration, complete with research and other
supporting materials upon which a favorably disposed House or
Senate can rely.111 To the extent the interest groups’ presentation
of research, background material, or draft legislation shortcut the
political players’ consideration of a given issue, it lowers the polit-
ical players’ response costs.
Interest groups can also potentially lower political response costs
by raising the salience of issues that would otherwise remain low
on the political branches’ to-do lists. The very act of lobbying lowers
political players’ response costs by lowering the search costs asso-
ciated with becoming aware of an issue. In addition, to the extent
“the squeaky wheel gets the grease,” lobbying activity can lower a
player’s opportunity costs by moving the issue up in the queue rela-
tive to other issues.
An interest group opposed to a congressional override has a some-
what more limited menu of options. It can, of course, provide its
own competing research and other supporting materials to those
members of the political body likely to be receptive to its views; they
may also lobby the relevant legislators and staffers heavily in an
attempt to stop or slow the legislative process. But the dynamics of
the committee-level legislative process are such that most of any
interest group’s cost-increasing weapons are likely to be somewhat
less effective than its cost-decreasing tools.
111. See id.
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C. Applying the Model to Three Real-World Contexts
1. Federal Civil Pleading Standards After Ashcroft v. Iqbal
a. Case Background
In May 2009, the Supreme Court cemented and arguably
extended a particularly conservative interpretation of the federal
civil pleading standard with its five-to-four decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.112
Before Iqbal and its 2007 companion case Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Court had routinely interpreted the pleading stan-
dard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) remarkably liberally.
This rule, intended as the centerpiece of the entire Federal Rules
project,113 requires only that a plaintiff provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”114 The paradigm example of the Court’s liberal interpreta-
tion of the rule appeared in Conley v. Gibson, which held that a
plaintiff’s claim should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”115
In Twombly, the Court rejected the classic Conley formulation,
holding that in a complex antitrust case, Conley’s “no set of facts”
language had “earned its retirement.”116 Instead, the Court held
that the class action plaintiffs in Twombly could survive a motion
to dismiss only if their factual allegations made the existence of a
prohibited antitrust conspiracy “plausible.”117 Because the Court
thought the plaintiffs’ allegations equally consistent with both the
112. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
113. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1749, 1749 (1998); see also Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV.
272, 272 (1942). Clark did note, however, that the complexity and technicality of common law
pleading was only part of the story. Id. at 274-75. In Clark’s retelling, the common law
pleading system remained simple and direct for many categories of claims but fell into
disrepute due to lawyers’ pleading practices in other case types. See id. at 275.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
115. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2009).
116. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
117. Id. at 570.
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existence and the nonexistence of a conspiracy, it dismissed the
case.118
For a variety of reasons, many commentators and courts initially
assumed that Twombly’s application was limited to the antitrust
context.119 This perception, coupled with the fact that the federal
government was divided from 2007-2009,120 apparently led Congress
to take little interest in the case.121
So the Court doubled down in Iqbal. In that case, the Court
clearly stated that the “plausibility” standard announced in
Twombly applied to all federal claims, including Mr. Iqbal’s alle-
gation that then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and then-FBI
Director Robert Mueller had been personally involved in a conspir-
acy to deny various constitutional and statutory rights to Muslim
men detained in connection with terrorism investigations.122 In the
Court’s view, Iqbal alleged no facts tending to make the existence
of a conspiracy involving Ashcroft and Mueller plausible.123 Thus,
the Court remanded Iqbal’s case to the court of appeals with
instructions to determine whether Iqbal should be given further
opportunity to amend his deficient complaint.124
By the time the Court decided Iqbal in May 2009, the political
landscape had vastly changed. President Obama took office in
January 2009 with substantial Democratic working majorities in
both chambers of Congress.125 Riding Obama’s electoral coattails,
the Senate moved from an even split in the 110th Congress to a
sixteen-seat majority in the 111th, and House Democrats increased
118. Id. at 564-65, 570.
119. See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to a Federal Pleading
Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 632 (2006).
120. Democrats effectively controlled both houses of the 110th Congress while George W.
Bush was president. See MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22555, MEMBERSHIP OF
THE 110TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 2 (2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/
resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf.
121. Cf. supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing what inferences may be made
from congressional inaction).
122. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666, 678 (2009).
123. Id. at 680.
124. Id. at 687.
125. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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their margin from thirty-one to seventy-nine seats as a result of the
2008 elections.126
Moreover, Democrats in both chambers were obviously aware of
the Iqbal decision, which some publicly decried as “limit[ing]
Americans’ access to courts.”127 Senate Democrats held formal
hearings in December 2009, and members of Congress proposed
multiple bills aimed at “fixing” the Iqbal problem.128 Ultimately,
however, these bills went nowhere; when Republicans regained
control of the House in January 2011,129 they effectively ended
discussion of a statutory response to Iqbal until the 2012 election
cycle at the earliest.
b. Applying the Model
The model I introduced in Parts I and II provides a plausible
explanation for congressional silence in response to Iqbal. I acknow-
ledge yet again that it is likely impossible to identify political
preferences precisely, and that it is similarly difficult to quantify
political response costs with complete accuracy. That said, what is
known about both political preferences and costs is more than
suggestive.
If we array the relevant players’ pleading standard preferences
along a single-dimension continuum from “plaintiff friendly” on the
left to “defense friendly” on the right, it seems clear that all three
political players’ ideal points in 2009 and 2010 lay well to the left
of the Supreme Court’s. And if we take a two-dimensional approach,
mapping “plaintiff-friendly-to-defense-friendly” preferences on
one axis, and lower-to-higher judicial workload on the other, for
example, the story is much the same.130 In a two-dimensional
126. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789-Present, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/partyDiv.aspx (last visited
Feb. 14, 2013); Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.
gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
127. See, e.g., Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing on
S. 1504 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 172 (2009) (statement of Sen.
Russell D. Feingold).
128. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
129. Carl Hulse, Republicans Retake House, Ousting Old and New Alike, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 2010, at P1.
130. If I were to depict the Iqbal problem graphically, I would probably select a one-
dimensional approach, because most other plausible policy dimensions would likely be
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analysis, we would expect the Supreme Court to occupy the corner
opposite of the political players’ preferences; it is quite unlikely that
the Court’s absolute preferences fell within the political players’
Pareto triangle.
In addition, the response costs associated with a legislative
response to Iqbal were almost certainly sufficiently high to give the
Court interpretive discretion outside of the Pareto space. There is
admittedly little reason to believe that process costs were par-
ticularly high; neither House Judiciary Committee Chair John
Conyers131 nor Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Patrick Leahy132
was likely to stand in the way of a response; the same is true for the
relevant subcommittee chairs. But search and specificity costs and
opportunity costs are another matter entirely.
Although members of Congress did introduce several bills as
proposed statutory fixes for Iqbal, none of the proposed statutes
was particularly likely to effectively cabin Court discretion. For the
most part, the proposed bills fell into one of two categories: “Conley”
or “Conley-plus.” For example, the leading Senate bill attempted to
explicitly codify Conley:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress
or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which takes effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a
Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6)
or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).133
By contrast, the leading House version would have codified a
Conley-plus approach by expressly readopting the “no set of facts”
relatively unimportant to the political branches. Thus, the equal value assumption would be
particularly problematic.
131. Biography of John Conyers, Jr., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://conyers.
house.gov/index.cfm/biography (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). Congressman Conyers was a
cosponsor of the leading House effort to override Iqbal. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009,
H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
132. The Committee Chairman, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/chairman.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (listing
Senator Patrick Leahy as the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
133. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
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standard from Conley, while explicitly rejecting the relevance of
judicially determined “plausibility”:
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6),
(c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint under
one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the
judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the
plaintiff's claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-
duct alleged.134
But neither the codification of Conley nor the Conley-plus approach
really solves the problem. Pleading requirements effectively must
be governed by a standard rather than a rule. So long as congressio-
nal preferences lie somewhere between the two politically untenable
extremes of “all cases go to discovery” and “no cases go to discov-
ery,” the only realistic way for Congress to express those prefer-
ences is in the form of a standard delegating substantial authority
to the Supreme Court and inferior courts to decide on a case-by-case
basis.
In fact, pleading law is necessarily something of a metastandard.
Courts are generally called upon to exercise mandatory jurisdiction
over myriad forms of civil disputes, including disputes in which
liability is governed by rules, by standards, and everything in
between. Given the functionally infinite variation in fact patterns
and governing substantive law, crafting a fully determined rule
codifying any ideal point in the great middle between “all cases” and
“no cases” would be breathtakingly expensive and likely function-
ally impossible. Assuming that the congressional ideal point does
in fact lie somewhere in that great middle, courts will necessarily
have to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether a given claim passes muster. In terms of the model, this
means that search and specificity response costs for the pleading
problem would be extremely high.
134. H.R. 4115.
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Another proposed statutory response, this one introduced by
Senator Specter on the eve of his departure from the Senate, dem-
onstrates the challenge.135 In an attempt to capture the benefits of
the Court’s pre-Twombly jurisprudence without providing excess
discretion, the Specter bill would have imposed a date limitation on
the Court:
Except as expressly provided by an Act of Congress enacted
before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act ... or by an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effective on
or after that date, the law governing a dismissal, striking, or
judgment described under subsection (b) shall be in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in decisions issued before
May 20, 2007.136
With this bill, Senator Specter implicitly recognized that congressio-
nal preferences regarding pleading requirements were extraordi-
narily difficult to express in detailed, discretion-eliminating terms.
Instead, Specter attempted to import a standard by embracing all
pre-2007 Supreme Court pleading cases statutorily. 
But this approach too would fall well short of eliminating the
Court’s discretion. The Supreme Court is extraordinarily good at
distinguishing its own precedent. Though Specter’s final attempt
would have negated the portion of Twombly in which the Court
“retired” the “no set of facts” language from Conley,137 neither the
2010 Specter bill nor any of the other proposed statutory fixes
would have prevented the Court from reaching functionally the
same result by other means. Thus, even though Congress could
more or less identify what it wanted with respect to civil pleading
standards, it found it extremely difficult, and concomitantly costly,
to put those preferences into the sort of detailed language that
would have simultaneously eliminated judicial discretion while
preserving the actual political preference.
Finally, the political players also faced high opportunity costs in
connection with the pleading debate. During 2009 and 2010,
135. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. (2010).
136. Id. § 3(a) (emphasis added).
137. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007).
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Congress and the President were focused on a variety of higher
profile issues, including a faltering economy, post-crisis financial
sector regulation reform, and an enormously important and con-
tentious debate over national healthcare policy.138 Though the
pleading standard controversy was substantially more salient than
most civil procedure related issues, it still fell far short of being a
top priority for any of the political players.
Given this distribution of preferences and costs, it is at least
plausible that the Supreme Court was able to decide Iqbal without
congressional response at least in part because the costs associated
with that response were too high.
2. Bailing Out of the Voting Rights Act After NAMUDNO v.
Holder
a. Case Background
When the Court interprets statutes, it is generally supposed to
give expression to “congressional intent,” however divined.139 But
the Court enjoys its own area of interpretive primacy as well: con-
stitutional law. As a practical matter, finding a statute unconstitu-
tional is effectively a trump card. In terms of the model, a Supreme
Court finding of unconstitutionality would dramatically increase
political response costs, in most cases well beyond what the political
players would be willing to incur.140
But the self-interested Court might use its constitutional au-
thority in another way as well: it may obtain additional protection
for an unpopular statutory interpretation by threatening a constitu-
138. See The Road We’ve Traveled, YOUTUBE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2POembdArVo/ (documentary on President Obama’s first term).
139. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
140. Consider Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The
Court’s holding that certain provisions of a campaign finance statute violated the First
Amendment led to numerous proposed statutory responses aimed at curbing the perceived
evils of the holding. Id. at 889. As of this writing, none have gained passage. See DISCLOSE
Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); DISCLOSE Act, S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010). As a general
rule, the presence of the constitutional issue generally means that the available benefits of
a partial solution do not exceed the costs of enacting that solution.
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tional response. This is a plausible account of the Court’s actions in
NAMUDNO.141
Among other things, the Voting Rights Act attempts to remedy
voting-related racial discrimination in geographic regions histori-
cally associated with discriminatory practices.142 Section 5 of the
Act requires political subdivisions within those areas to seek
“preclearance” from a federal three-judge panel before making any
changes to their voting procedures.143 This preclearance require-
ment is subject to a limited “bailout” exception allowing certain gov-
ernment entities to bail out of the requirement if they satisfy
certain stringent conditions.144
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One
(NAMUDNO) is a small government subdivision responsible for
delivering certain government services to residents of Travis
County, Texas.145 In 2006, NAMUDNO filed suit in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory
judgment stating that, because it had no history of voting dis-
crimination, it should be allowed to bail out of the preclearance
requirement and change its election procedures without judicial
preclearance.146 In the alternative, NAMUDNO alleged that section
5 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress’s enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment.147
The statutorily mandated three-judge panel unanimously re-
jected both claims.148 It first held that NAMUDNO was ineligible to
seek a bailout because the statute limits bailout eligibility to states
and political subdivisions that actually register voters, which
NAMUDNO does not do.149 It then upheld the constitutionality of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, concluding that the preclearance
requirements remained rational in light of an extensive record of
continued race-related voting rights violations in covered states.150
141. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
142. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c(a) (2006).
143. Id. § 1973c(a).
144. Id. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c(a).
145. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 200.
146. Id. at 200-01.
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 201.
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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The Supreme Court reversed.151 In an essentially unanimous
opinion,152 the Supreme Court rejected the district court’s statutory
interpretation, holding instead that NAMUDNO was eligible to
seek a bailout under the Voting Rights Act.153 Citing its customary
avoidance doctrine, the eight-member majority expressly refused to
reach the constitutional issue, instead basing its disposition of the
case entirely upon the statutory interpretation claim.154
But the Court did not leave the constitutional backdrop wholly
undisturbed. Rather, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion ex-
plored in some detail both the purported improvements in voting
rights since the Act’s initial passage155 and the federalism burdens
imposed by the preclearance requirement.156 Moreover, Roberts’s
opinion issued what might be interpreted as shots across the polit-
ical bow, noting that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be
justified by current needs,” and that “[w]hether conditions continue
to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional question [that
the Court does] not answer today.”157
b. Applying the Model
Some commentators have interpreted NAMUDNO as a warning
to Congress to update section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to reflect
modern discrimination concerns.158 This may well be the case, but
NAMUDNO’s constitutional threats may have another effect: they
151. Id. at 211.
152. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part; he would
have reached the constitutional issue and would have found section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act unconstitutional in light of the decrease in racially motivated voting discrimination since
the Act’s original passage. Id. at 212-29 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 211 (majority opinion).
154. Id. at 205-06.
155. Id. at 202-03.
156. E.g., id. at 202 (“These federalism costs have caused Members of this Court to express
serious misgivings about the constitutionality of § 5.”).
157. Id. at 203, 211.
158. See, e.g., Richard L. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in RACE, REFORM,
AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
17, 25 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (“Given this, the NAMUDNO opinion may be
seen as a warning to Congress: Either modernize Section 5 or risk seeing it struck down in
a future decision.”).
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may raise the political costs of responding to the Court’s question-
able statutory interpretation opinion past the point of feasibility.
The Court decided NAMUDNO on June 22, 2009, just a few
weeks after Iqbal.159 The same Democrat-dominated political appa-
ratus that confronted Iqbal was thus faced with deciding whether
to pass corrective legislation in response to NAMUDNO as well.160
There is reason to believe that the House, Senate, and President
all would have preferred an interpretation that excluded
NAMUDNO from bailout eligibility. First, numerous Democratic
members of Congress took the rather unusual step of filing an
amicus brief in support of the federal government’s position that
preclearance was necessary.161 Second, Democratic lawmakers
have long been more reluctant than their Republican counterparts
to ease regulations designed to remedy racial discrimination in
voting.162 Racial minorities are critically important electoral constit-
uencies to many Democratic politicians,163 and it is plausible to
assume that these officials would prefer that exceptions to the
Voting Rights Act remain extremely limited.
But the response cost story looks quite different from the Iqbal
example. With respect to liberal Voting Rights Act legislation from
January 2009 through January 2011, we would again expect pro-
cess costs to be low; no reason exists to believe that any Democratic
legislator would use her agenda-setting power to delay an override.
And this time, search and specificity costs were also low. It would
have been remarkably simple for Congress to clarify that political
subdivisions like NAMUDNO were not eligible to seek a bailout
from the Act’s preclearance requirements—several lines of text
would have solved the problem.
159. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 193; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 662 (2009)
(decided May 18, 2009).
160. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
161. See Brief of Barbara Lee et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, NAMUDNO,
557 U.S. 193 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 871819; Brief of Rep. John Conyers, Jr. et al., supra note
8.
162. See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 670-71 (2008).
163. See, e.g., Zoltan Hajnal & Taeku Lee, The Untold Future of American Politics,
CAMPAIGN STOPS (June 4, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
06/04/the-untold-future-of-american-politics/.
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Similarly, opportunity costs were almost certainly lower as to
NAMUDNO than as to Iqbal. Voting rights are an important and
highly salient issue to Democratic lawmakers, and they should have
been all the more so in light of the then-recent election of the
nation’s first African American President.164
What, then, explains political silence after NAMUDNO? Perhaps
the constitutional portion of the Court’s opinion substantially raised
the political players’ response costs. By questioning the continued
constitutional viability of section 5, the Court strongly implied that
the current regime, including a broad reading of government sub-
division bailout rights, lies at the constitutional boundary. Thus, a
political player contemplating a response to the interpretation must
simultaneously consider an additional category of costs: those asso-
ciated with the likelihood that the Court will declare the entire pre-
clearance scheme unconstitutional if the line is crossed.
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s well-accepted primacy in consti-
tutional matters arguably gave it the ability to protect an interpre-
tation of the Voting Rights Act with which the President and a
substantial majority of Congress likely disagreed; by threatening a
constitutional response, the Court raised political response costs in
an otherwise low-cost environment.
3. A Low-Cost Counterexample: The Lilly Ledbetter Override
A clearer picture of the model’s implications emerges in cases in
which the political players ultimately do successfully override a
Supreme Court interpretation.165 The Court’s 2007 opinion in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. offers a particularly useful
164. See Adam Liptak, Review of Voting Rights Act Presents a Test of History v. Progress,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A16.
165. The fact that Congress occasionally overrides the Court’s statutory interpretations
does challenge some of the model’s assumptions. In particular, a successful, relatively
contemporaneous override may be inconsistent with some combination of the following
assumptions: perfect/complete information for the Court, the Court’s inherent risk aversity,
and the Court’s assumed desire to maximize its own preferences in a single-iteration
interaction. But my primary purpose in elucidating the model is to demonstrate the
maximum interpretive space available to the Court under ideal conditions. I do not claim
that my stylized model describes the real world with complete accuracy; rather, I include
those assumptions to help define the battleground. 
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example of the dynamics that do not significantly impede a political
response.166
a. Case Background
Just before Lilly Ledbetter retired from her twenty-year career
as a Goodyear plant supervisor in 1998, she initiated proceedings
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
claiming illegal sex-based discrimination during a series of per-
formance evaluations dating back many years.167 Specifically,
Ledbetter claimed that the significant current disparity in pay
between herself and her male counterparts was the cumulative
result of these discriminatory evaluations.168 A jury awarded
Ledbetter back pay and damages.169 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
erased Ledbetter’s trial victory, holding that the relevant discrete
acts of discrimination—her negative performance reviews—
occurred outside the 180-day limitations period imposed by Title
VII.170 
Before the Supreme Court, Ledbetter argued that every paycheck
reflecting the past discrimination constituted a separate actionable
violation of Title VII.171 Thus, in Ledbetter’s view, she was entitled
to sue for damages and back pay in connection with each paycheck
received less than 180 days before she initiated EEOC pro-
ceedings.172
The Supreme Court decided the case on May 29, 2007.173 Justice
Alito’s opinion for the five-member majority agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit, holding that Ledbetter’s pay disparity claims were
time barred.174 The majority opinion interpreted Title VII to permit
only claims in which the discrete acts of discrimination producing
the pay disparity occurred within the limitations period.175 A four-
166. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
167. Id. at 621-22.
168. Id. at 622.
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 622-23.
171. Id. at 624-25.
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 618.
174. Id. at 642-43.
175. Id. at 643.
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Justice dissent authored by Justice Ginsburg took Ledbetter’s side,
arguing that pay disparity claims typically arise incrementally and
hence are harder to detect than traditional termination or “failure
to promote” claims.176 The dissent, therefore, would have upheld
Ledbetter’s paycheck-based claims.177
On January 29, 2009, just nine days after his inauguration,
President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.178
The statute legislatively overrode the Court’s Ledbetter decision in
two sentences:
(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment
practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation
in violation of this subchapter, when a discriminatory compensa-
tion decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice, or when an individual is affected by application
of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other
practice.
(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1981a of
this title, liability may accrue and an aggrieved person may
obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1), including recovery
of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge,
where the unlawful employment practices that have occurred
during the charge filing period are similar or related to unlawful
employment practices with regard to discrimination in compen-
sation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.179
Thus, the current statute is specific and effectively discretion-
eliminating: a Title VII plaintiff subject to a discriminatory com-
pensation practice suffers an actionable violation whenever she is
“affected by application of a discriminatory compensation de-
cision.”180 And just to be sure, the statute is explicit about paycheck-
176. Id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 660-61.
178. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (2006)).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3).
180. Id.
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based claims: the affected employee has a new cause of action “each
time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid.”181
b. Applying the Model
The federal political landscape in January 2009 was quite a bit
different than it had been in May 2007. When the Court issued its
opinion in Ledbetter, a relatively conservative, probusiness Republi-
can President and an evenly divided Senate counterbalanced a
House of Representatives in which Democrats enjoyed only a thirty-
one seat majority.182 Given the dynamics of the moment, it seems
quite likely that the Court’s opinion originally fell within the policy
space over which the political players might have been able to agree
to a response. In other words, the Court’s opinion likely was orig-
inally within the Pareto space where any attempt to improve one
political veto player’s lot would have come only at the expense of
one or both of the other political players. As such, the interpretation
was safe from revision when the Court decided the case, regardless
of the response-cost dynamics facing the players.
We have already discussed the very different political dynamics
of 2009-2011.183 Even without the evidentiary value of the overrid-
ing legislation itself, an objective observer would have predicted
that the preferences of the new political players lay well to the left
of the Court’s interpretation. It thus seems virtually certain that,
once Congress and the White House changed hands, the Court’s
interpretation in Ledbetter fell outside the always-safe Pareto space
between the political players’ own positions.
But the congressional override embodied in the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009 was only possible because the dynamics of the
moment allowed the political players to overcome their response
costs as well. Unlike the Iqbal and NAMUDNO examples, response
costs were almost uniformly low in connection with the Ledbetter
response.184
181. Id.
182. George W. Bush, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/
georgewbush (last visited Feb.14, 2013); Party Divisions of the House of Representatives,
1789-Present, supra note 126; Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, supra note 126.
183. Supra notes 125-26, 129 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part III.C.1.b (Iqbal); Part III.C.2.b (NAMUDNO).
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As with each of our previous examples, no reason exists to believe
that process costs associated with a legislative response to Ledbetter
were abnormally high. And unlike Iqbal, the search and specificity
costs associated with a congressional response to Ledbetter were
also remarkably low.185 The entirety of the response—a highly
detailed and effectively discretion-eliminating statute with respect
to the limitations issue in Ledbetter—consists of two sentences
amended to Title VII’s definitions section.186 Congress’s purpose in
drafting this law was to ensure that discrimination claims based
upon pay disparity accrued for limitations purposes every time the
plaintiff received a paycheck reflecting the discrimination.187 It took
the political players less than 175 words to do so.188
Finally, opportunity costs for this particular response were
abnormally low. The Ledbetter decision itself was both highly sali-
ent and wildly unpopular among Democrats when it was handed
down,189 and congressional efforts to override the decision in 2007-
2008 were predictably unavailing. Then-Senator Obama upped the
ante by making the case an important part of his 2008 campaign
for the presidency; Lilly Ledbetter appeared in Obama campaign
advertisements and was also a featured speaker at the 2008
Democratic National Convention.190
Moreover, the new Democratic establishment almost certainly
viewed the Ledbetter response as particularly important because it
represented a low-cost, symbolic repudiation of its predecessors’
policies. President Obama’s signing statement confirms the rhetor-
ical and symbolic importance of the legislation:
So in signing this bill today, I intend to send a clear message:
That making our economy work means making sure it works for
everyone. That there are no second class citizens in our
workplaces, and that it's not just unfair and illegal - but bad for
185. See supra Part III.C.1.b.
186. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (2006).
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, Op-Ed., 44 Years Later, Still Fighting for Equal Pay,
U.S. FED. NEWS, June 7, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24801620.
190. Lilly Ledbetter at 2008 DNC, YOUTUBE (Sept. 16, 2008), http://youtube.com/watch?v
=r9I_U4WpItQ; “Need Education” Ad, YOUTUBE (Sept. 18, 2008), http://youtube.com/
watch?v=QxqjAejRF94.
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business - to pay someone less because of their gender, age, race,
ethnicity, religion or disability. And that justice isn't about some
abstract legal theory, or footnote in a casebook - it's about how
our laws affect the daily realities of people's lives: their ability
to make a living and care for their families and achieve their
goals.191
Opportunity costs for the 111th Congress and the newly installed
forty-fourth President were thus particularly low, both because the
Democratic Party’s 2008 focus on the issue forced the response to
the front of the queue, and because it offered a low-risk opportunity
to announce the presence of a new sheriff in town on just the ninth
of President Obama’s first hundred days in office.
The Ledbetter decision and legislative response together perfectly
demonstrate the preference and cost dynamics that would not allow
a hypothetically self-interested and myopic Supreme Court to devi-
ate from political preferences in pursuit of its own goals. The
opinion survived for seventeen months only because the political
dynamic from June 2007 through December 2008 was radically
different.192 Once the polity shifted, remarkably low response costs
did not stand in the political players’ paths.
CONCLUSION: AMBITION, MODESTY, AND AMBITION
This Article is ultimately both enormously ambitious and
decidedly modest in its aims. On the ambitious end of the scale, I
offer for the first time a model of the interactions between the
Supreme Court and its political counterparts that accounts for the
transaction costs associated with political responses to statutory
interpretation opinions. By incorporating these costs into the anal-
ysis, we gain critical insights into when a myopically self-interested,
or tragically mistaken, Court can and cannot use the difficulties
inherent in the Article I, Section 7 legislative process to give effect
to policy preferences that differ from current political preferences. 
Even with its limitations, the model demonstrates a number of
unique and potentially surprising characteristics that almost
191. Obama Signs Lilly Ledbetter Act, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2009, 10:27 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/01/29/obama_signs_lilly_ledbetter_ac.html.
192. See supra notes 126, 182 and accompanying text.
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certainly have real-world analogues. For example, the model dem-
onstrates that the basic dynamics of the political response process
present a net-benefit problem with substantial free-riding and
sunk-cost risks. A single player whose internal calculus promises
a net benefit if it incurs response costs essentially guarantees that
response, even if the other players have no incentive to lift a finger. 
But the intrinsically sequential nature of the political response
bargaining process also presents a risk in the absence of credible
reputational constraints or other precommitment devices. Some po-
litically desirable responses may not materialize because the player
with the strongest incentives to incur response costs may rationally
be concerned that the other players will take advantage of its sunk
cost expenditures by insisting upon benefit-eliminating changes
after the fact.
Expanding the analysis to two dimensions demonstrates other
interesting phenomena with direct application to our understanding
of how political processes actually work. The inclusion of response
costs in a two-dimensional model demonstrates the way in which
the Court can trade dimensions off against one another in pursuit
of an interpretation that provides the same overall benefit to the
Court with less risk of override. It is hardly implausible to imagine
a self-interested Court giving the closest political player more of
what that player wants in order to obtain protection from the other
political actors. 
This Article represents a significant, foundational step forward
in understanding the way government actors, and sometimes in-
terest groups, interact; in fact, the insights of this Article are
applicable, with little or no modification, to a variety of other
regulatory contexts involving veto players and/or the delegation of
interpretive authority. For example, the model can be used to
predict whether the political players will respond to any inherited
policy, whether generated by the Supreme Court, a predecessor
legislature, or nature itself. The model can also be applied to the
executive agency context with certain modifications reflecting the
higher level of presidential control over agency policy and the
somewhat lower costs of constraining agencies without the use of
detailed, discretion-eliminating statutory schemes. In many ways,
this foundational Article is just the beginning of an enormously
ambitious project.
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At the same time, however, the Article is deliberately and notably
modest in at least three distinct ways. First, I do not attempt to
describe actual judicial behavior completely. Of course, substantial
value exists in looking at political decision making as I do—through
a utility-maximizing, rational-actor lens. People do sometimes act
in their own perceived self-interest, even when duty or morality
arguably compels a different result. And the Supreme Court, an
inherently political body, ultimately opines on many matters of
significant political concern. Thus, rational-actor analysis is a good
starting point.193 
But this does not foreclose the possibility that the Court acts in
response to other motivations. The Court may in fact act out of its
own internal sense of duty for duty’s sake. Or it may act to
maximize—but on some other dimension that does not appear in my
figures—resources like its own judicial reputation or leisure time.194
The insights of other disciplines may apply in this context as well.
For example, the players may be subject to biases or internal
heuristics that lead them away from strictly “rational” behavior. 
My claims with respect to predicting actual judicial outcomes,
especially in any single anecdotal context, are correspondingly
modest. The model is designed simply to help us identify the outer
boundaries of the interpretive space available to the Court, not to
tell us what any particular Court will do in any particular con-
text.195
Second, even assuming that the Court acts to maximize its own
policy preferences, the limits of the model and its underlying as-
sumptions compel another form of modesty. This Article is deliber-
ately foundational rather than comprehensive, and my assumptions
reflect that approach. For example, statutory interpretation is
rarely a single-iteration interaction; rather, the Court, House,
Senate, and President interact with one another repeatedly across
time and multiple regulatory contexts. These repeat interactions
193. See Paul J. Stancil, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: A (Short) Manifesto on the
Necessity of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2011).
194. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
195. That said, the opportunities for follow-up empirical research are significant. The
model necessarily implies that, on balance and all else equal, the Court will deviate from
political preferences more successfully when response costs are high.
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undoubtedly affect outcomes; even a blatantly self-interested Court
would pick its battles, for example. Moreover, the political players
will typically benefit from their own repeated interactions with one
another, because their accumulated reputational capital will allow
for more cooperation than a single-iteration interaction would
predict.
Other assumptions compel modesty as well. It is unlikely that
any player can identify every other player’s ideal point or response
costs with precision, for example. Even given that knowledge, it
may be remarkably difficult for the players to process the informa-
tion effectively. In future work, I will incorporate the effects of both
substantive and process uncertainty196 into an expanded version of
the model, but this foundational treatment is sufficiently complex
without adding that particular wrinkle.197
Finally, the Article is normatively modest, with good reason.
There are, of course, multiple ways in which the insights offered by
the model might shine some light onto a number of well-rehearsed
normative puzzles. But for the most part, the normative implica-
tions of my descriptive model are deeply ambiguous.
Like the challenges associated with interest group theory,198 the
normative implications of the model depend largely upon imported
normative baselines extrinsic to the analysis. One concerned pri-
marily with getting the “right result” in the form of particular
preferred policies may, for example, find the model’s implications
normatively attractive or disturbing, depending upon whether she
196. See, e.g., David Dequech, The New Institutional Economics and the Theory of
Behaviour Under Uncertainty, 59 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 109, 112 (2006); see also Dosi &
Egidi, supra note 71, at 146. Under this taxonomy, “[s]ubstantive uncertainty results from
the lack of all the information which would be necessary to make decisions with certain
outcomes.” Dequech, supra, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s inability
to gauge congressional preferences falls into this category. Procedural uncertainty, by
contrast, “arises from limitations on the computational and cognitive capabilities of the
agents to pursue unambiguously their objectives, given the available information.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, the determination of an equilibrium
in the multidimensional context would require the Court to engage in the human equivalent
of semidefinite programming; there may well be limitations on even the most well-informed
and myopically self-interested Court’s ability to engage in this analysis with precision.
197. Similar stories can be told for several other assumptions as well, including the
assumption that the Court itself faces no costs. The introduction of additional institutional
features, such as the lower courts, would complicate matters even further.
198. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 110, at 34.
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thinks that the Court or the political apparatus is more likely to
provide the results she desires. 
A process-oriented theorist will have no less trouble; her assess-
ment of the model will depend ultimately upon, among other things,
the extent to which she is comfortable with judicial review generally
and the value, if any, she places on nonconstitutional counter-
majoritarian interpretation as a check on political extremism. And
even if she concludes that the current preferences of the polity de-
serve primacy in the abstract, she will still confront a host of effi-
ciency concerns: How much discretion is too much for the Court,
given the advantages of delegation more generally?
Things are further complicated by a potential “second-best” prob-
lem. The judicial process may sometimes be the best practical
option for “correcting” the status quo, albeit imperfectly, depending
upon one’s assessment of the general location of the run of current
inherited policies relative to current political preferences; the
location of the Court’s preferences relative to both inherited policies
and current political preferences; and the relative political response
costs associated with both desirable and undesirable inherited
polices.199 
For example, return briefly to a slightly altered version of our
charter schools example with two twists: (1) the inherited policy lies
to the right of all players, including the Court; and (2) uniformly
high transaction costs make any political response to even the
political extreme represented by the inherited status quo infeasible.
In that case, the Court might offer a second-best solution, moving
the policy to its own ideal point. The final policy would still lie far
outside the political players’ “natural” negotiation range, but it
would also be far better than the inherited policy.
My future work in this area will be less modest. Future articles
will build upon the foundation I have laid here, taking up many of
the technical, theoretical, and normative issues I have deliberately
pushed to the side in order to present this baseline analysis. 
199. For a similar argument, see Paul Stancil, The Problem with One-Size-Fits-All
Procedure (Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that court-
sponsored rule making is sometimes superior to remedial legislation in correcting past
legislative mistakes).
